High Court Of Rajasthan
CIT Vs. Hari Kishan Vijayvergia
Section : 245D
Arun Mishra, CJ. And S.S. Kothari, J.
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 989 Of 2009
May 6, 2011
ORDER
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1. The intra-court appeals have been preferred as against the common order dated 13-8-2009 passed by the Single Bench in Civil Writ Petition No. 12911/2008 whereby bunch of writ applications were decided. 117 writ applications were preferred by the revenue whereas 14 writ applications were preferred by the assessees. Applications for settlement were filed before the Settlement Commission on or before 1-6-2007. The orders were passed by the Settlement Commission under section 245D(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The revenue assailed the orders mainly on the ground that opportunity of hearing was not afforded as provided under section 245D(4) of the Act. It was also submitted that the Settlement Commission became functus officio and the proceedings stood abated in terms of the provisions of section 245HA of the Act. Assessee also raised the question during proceedings which were held before the Settlement Commission before the orders were passed. It was submitted that procedure adopted by the Settlement Commission while passing the orders is in flagrant violation of the provisions of section 245D(4) of the Act. The orders were passed without application of mind and appreciation of material on record.
2. The Single Bench has held that the Settlement Commission did not become functus officio. Cases have been remitted according to the procedure as provided under section 245D(4). The Single Bench has remitted the matter to the Settlement Commission to examine the same afresh, after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties and whatever amount has been deposited by the respective assessee under the orders impugned would be subject to final outcome of the applications under section 245C on orders being passed under section 245D(4). In case, refund is ordered after passing of the order, assessee would be entitled for the interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum. The Single Bench has clarified that without influenced by observations in the order, let matters be decided afresh after due compliance of provisions of section 245D(4) of the Act. Aggrieved thereby, the revenue as well as some of the assessee have preferred the intra-court appeals.
3. J.K. Singhi, Senior Standing Counsel of the Income-tax Department assisted by Mr. Anuroop Singhi has submitted that the Settlement Commission has become functus officio, as such cases could not have been remitted to the Settlement Commission to decide the matter afresh. In case of the pending applications provision was that if they were not decided on or before 31-3-2008, they would be treated as abated after 31-3-2008. However, with respect to the opportunity of hearing, stand of the revenue is that it was necessary to grant them opportunity of hearing in terms of section 245D(4) of the Act which was not done. Consequently, the orders passed were illegal. Learned counsel has also submitted that it was not proper for the Single Bench to direct that in case refund is ordered, interest would be payable at the rate of 15 per cent per annum. In case of refund, interest is payable at the rate of 6 per cent per annum.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of assessee have jointly submitted that considering the object for which Settlement Commission has been established, it is not necessary to pass reasoned orders. Learned counsel have placed reliance upon the decisions in CIT v. B.N. Bhattachargee [1979] 118 ITR 461 (SC) at 470 & 478, CIT v. Om Prakash Mittal [2005] 273 ITR 326/ 143 Taxman 373 (SC) at 335 and Star Television News Ltd. v. Union of India [2009] 317 ITR 66/ 184 Taxman 400 (Bom.). Learned counsel have also submitted that in 25 cases in which assessees have come up in the intra-court appeals in Para 6 of the orders, reasons have been given. It has also been submitted that the orders appear to have been passed on cyclostyle sheets as in para 5, it has been mentioned in mechanical manner that it was not possible for the Commission to examine the record and investigate the case for proper settlement. Even giving of adequate opportunity to the applicant and the department, as laid down in section 245D(4) of the Act was not practicable However, to comply with the directions of the High Court, the orders were passed. The cyclostyle mentioning of the aforesaid facts is not going to cause dent in the reasoning given in Paras 4 and 6 of the orders. Consequently, remission of the case to the Settlement Commission was not called for in the cases of these 25 assessees who have preferred the intra-court appeals against the decision rendered by the Single Bench.
5. Mr. Ranka, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of assessee has submitted that the Settlement Commission does not become functus officio and the case can be remitted for which he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Guduthur Bros. v. ITO [1960] 40 ITR 298 and decision of Delhi High Court in Vatika Farms (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India [2008] 302 ITR 98/ 169 Taxman 366 and decision in Star Television News Ltd.’s case (supra). It was also submitted that the revenue has preferred writ applications before the Single Bench as afterthought. It was submitted by some of the learned counsel that after the tax was demanded by revenue as determined by the Settlement Commission, it was not open to the revenue to prefer writ applications. Mr. Ranka, Senior Advocate has also submitted that in view of provisions of section 245D(6A), assessee is required to pay simple interest at the rate of 15 per cent, as such, refund should also carry the same rate of interest, which has been ordered by the Single Bench. In case, refund is necessary interest has to be paid.
6. In addition Mr. Manoj Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the assessee has raised question of unjust enrichment relying upon the decision in CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala [2001] 119 Taxman 352 (SC).
7. We propose to deal with 25 cases of the assessee separately who have preferred the intra-court appeals in the later part of the order. Appeals/cross-objections were filed in the other matters.
8. First question for consideration is whether the Settlement Commission has become functus officio in view of the provisions of section 245D(4A). In these cases the applications were decided on or before 31-3-2008. Thus, there was no question of abatement of the applications. The question was whether the Settlement Commission has followed the procedure mandatory under section 245D(4) of the Act. It is not disputed in these cases that the procedure envisaged under section 245D(4) was not followed as opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the parties. Section 245D(4) of the Act is quoted below :
“245D(4) After examination of the records and the report of the Commissioner, if any, received under—
(i) sub-section (2B) or sub-section (3), or
(ii) the provisions of sub-section (1) as they stood immediately before their amendment by the Finance Act, 2007,
and after giving an opportunity to the applicant and to the Commissioner to be heard, either in person or through a representative duly authorised in this behalf, and after examining such further evidence as may be placed before it or obtained by it, the Settlement Commission may, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, pass such order as it thinks fit on the matters covered by the application and any other matter relating to the case not covered by the application, but referred to in the report of the Commissioner.”
It is apparent from the aforesaid provision that it is necessary to examine the record and report of the Commissioner, if any, received under sub-section (2B) or sub-section (3) or under the provisions of sub-section (1) as it stood immediately before their amendment by the Finance Act, 2007 with effect from 1-6-2007 and giving of opportunity of hearing is necessary that may be either in person or through a representative duly authorized in this behalf and after examining such further evidence as may be placed before it or obtained by it, the Settlement Commission may pass order in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Thus, it is necessary to examine the record, hear the parties and record the evidence as may be adduced. The Settlement Commission has observed that it was not practicable to hear the parties, examine the record and investigate the case for proper settlement. Even adequate opportunity of hearing as laid down under section 245D was not practicable and the orders were passed to meet directions issued by the High Court as an eye wash. It was incumbent upon the Settlement Commission to examine the record, investigate the case and record the evidence, as may be addued, for proper settlement and thereafter, pass appropriate order in accordance with the provisions of the Act, after giving opportunity of hearing to the assessee as well as revenue which has not been done. Thus, the orders passed were in flagrant violation of provisions of section 245D and therefore, the same were liable to be quashed and had been rightly quashed by the Single Bench.
9. It is not disputed at bar that even if the applications were not decided on 31-3-2008, there was no abatement as the view taken by various High Courts which has been affirmed by the High Court in various matters. In these cases applications were decided on or before 31-3-2008. There was no abatement. The question was that of legality of the orders passed by the Settlement Commission and in such cases, if the orders have been found to be illegal, in our considered opinion, Settlement Commission has jurisdiction to deal with the matters afresh after they are remitted to it in terms of the provisions of section 245D(4) of the Act after complying with the mandatory requirement.
10. Mr. Ranka, Senior Advocate has placed reliance upon the decision in Guduthur Bros.’ case (supra) in which the Apex Court has observed that notice was issued to the appellants to show cause why penalty should not be imposed for failure to file return in time. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has pointed out only an illegality which vitiated the proceedings after they were lawfully initiated. The notice having remained pending to be disposed of, the proceedings started after the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner could be described as during the course of the assessment proceedings, because the action would relate back to the time when the first notice was issued. In the instant case also, the matter will relate back to the time when the proceedings were initiated. Thus, there is no question of the Settlement Commission becoming functus officio after 31-3-2008. In Vatika Farms (P.) Ltd.’s case (supra) Delhi High Court has opined that even in case the amended provisions were applicable, it was not necessary to decide the pending application before the said date. The amendment could not be said to be reasonable as observed in Union of India v. Ram Kumar Arora [SLP (C) No. 16714 of 2009] and Union of India v. Vinod Kalra [SLP (C) No. 16722 of 2009] etc., raising the same question. The Apex Court also dismissed the special leave petition against the judgment dated 14-8-2008 passed by the Bombay High Court in Union of India v. Kunverji Vishram & Co. [2010] 321 ITR (St.) 167 whereby the Bombay High Court issued rule in the writ petitions pending further orders, directed the Settlement Commission not to dismiss the applications. In the instant cases there is no question of abatement, as orders were passed before the said date, even if, applications had not been decided. In these cases, there was decision which was not in accordance with law and was nullity being in flagrant violation of the principle of audi alteram partem and due opportunity envisaged under section 245D(4) of the Act. In Star Television News Ltd.’s case (supra) the High Court of Bombay has opined with respect to cut off date for Settlement Commission to complete the proceedings as arbitrary require to be read down so that proceedings treated as abated only where failure to decide in time limit owing to reasons attributable to applicant and if the reasons are not attributable to the assessee there was no abatement.
11. Mr. Ranka, Senior Advocate has also relied upon the decision in CIT v. National Taj Traders [1980] 121 ITR 535 /[1979] 2 Taxman 546 in which the Apex Court has laid down that limitation of two years for passing of the orders does not apply to orders passed on remand from Tribunal. The Apex Court has laid down. Thus,—
“Reference may now be made to a decision of this Court in Pooran Mall’s case, where in a similar situation arising under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a restricted construction was accorded by this Court to sub-section (5) thereof which prescribed certain period of limitation. In that case pursuant to an authorisation issued under section 132(1) of the 1961 Act searches were carried out on October 15 and 16, 1971 at the residence and business premises of P, an individual, and at certain office premises of the firms in which he was a partner, and jewellery, cash and account books were seized. There was also a search of two banks and a restraint order was made under section 132(3) in respect of 114 silver bars pledged with those banks on the ground that they were the property of P. On January 12, 1972, the Income-tax Officer passed a summary order under section 132(5) on the basis that all the assets seized and 114 silver bars belonged to P. Thereupon, P & Sons, one of the firms in which P was a partner, and P filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the order dated January 12, 1972 and on April 6, 1977, on the basis of the consent of the parties, the High Court quashed the order and permitted the department to make a fresh enquiry after giving an opportunity to the petitioner and pass a fresh order within two months. After a fresh enquiry the Income-tax Officer passed an order on June 5, 1972 holding that the silver bars belonged for P, the individual, and not the firm, P and Sons. Thereupon, the firm and P again filed a writ petition challenging the second order. The High Court held that the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to pass that order beyond the period prescribed in section 132(5) and set aside the order and directed the return of the 114 bars of silver. This Court held, inter alia, that the order made in pursuance of a direction given – under section 132(12) or by a Court in writ proceedings, was not subject to the limitation prescribed under section 132(5). At page 394 this Court has observed thus :
‘Even if the period of time fixed under section 132(5) is held to be mandatory that was satisfied when the first order was made. Thereafter, if any direction is given under section 132(2) or by a Court in writ proceedings, as in this case, we do not think an order made in pursuance of such a direction would be subject to the limitations prescribed under section 132(5). Once the order has been made within ninety days the aggrieved person has got the right to approach the notified authority under section 132(11) within thirty days and that authority can direct the Income-tax Officer to pass a fresh order. We cannot accept the contention on behalf of the respondents that even such a fresh order should be passed within ninety days. It would make the sub- sections (11) and (12) of section 132 ridiculous and useless.’
It may be pointed out that in section 132 there is no provision removing or relaxing the bar of limitation contained in section 132(5) enabling the Income-tax Officer to pass an order afresh pursuant to any direction issued to him by a higher authority under section 132(12) and even then this Court took the view that the limitation prescribed under section 132(5) will be applicable only to the initial order to be made by the Income-tax Officer and not to an order that would be made by him pursuant to a direction from the Board or notified authority. The concerned provisions were read together and such construction was put on sub-section (5) of section 132 as made a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
In the result, we are of opinion that the answer given by the High Court to the second aspect of the second question referred to it was clearly wrong and, in our view, the Tribunal’s order vacating the Commissioner’s order and directing the Commissioner to make assessment afresh after giving due opportunity to the respondent-assessee was proper. The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.”
The Apex Court has laid down in National Taj Traders’ case (supra) that limitation prescribed under section 132(5) will be applicable only to the initial order to be made by the ITO and not to an order that would be made by him pursuant to a direction from the Board or notified authority. Thus, in the instant case, we are of the opinion that the Settlement Commission does not become functus officio and has competence to pass order after the case has been remitted by Single Bench.
12. Mr. J.K. Singhi, Senior Standing Counsel for Income-tax Department assisted by Mr. Anuroop Singhi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of revenue has relied upon the decision in Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh [1993] 2 SCC 507, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. v. Bal Mukund Bairwa [2009] 4 SCC 299, A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak AIR 1988 SC 1531 and State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal [2008] 8 SCC 92 to contend that the court cannot confer the jurisdiction. In Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka’s case (supra) question was that Court of probate has exclusive jurisdiction. The Apex Court has held that Civil court in original side or arbitrator, even on the consent of parties, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon proof or validity of will propounded by the executor. The decision is not at all applicable to facts in the instant case, as the Settlement Commission was having jurisdiction which is not disputed and the case is being remitted to the Settlement Commission only. In State Bank of lndia’s case (supra), question came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was that once an order is passed the authority become functus offico. The Apex Court has laid down that once authority exercising quasi-judicial power takes a final decision, it cannot review its own decision unless the rules permit such review. But the question is as to at what stage an authority becomes functus officio in regard to an order made by him. P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon gives following illustrative definition of the term functus officio :
“Thus a Judge, when he has decided a question brought before him, is functus officio, and cannot review his own decision.”
In instant matters, question is totally different. Question is not that of the review. It is settled proposition of law that unless the relevant statute or rules permit such review, it cannot be made. It is not the review, which has been done in these cases. Case has been remitted by the Single Bench. Thus, the cases relate back to the stage when there was violation of provisions of section 245D(4) of the Act. The decision relied upon in State Bank of India’s case (supra) has no application. Reliance upon the decision in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn.’s case (supra) is equally futile in which question was of jurisdiction of the Civil Court and Labour Court and what relief could be given by the Civil Court with respect to dispute under Industrial Disputes Act. Decision has no application at all. The decision has altogether different field to operate. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the decision in A.R. Antulay’s case (supra) wherein the question was that the case under the Prevention of Corruption Act was triable by Special Judge. It was laid down by the Apex Court that the Supreme Court was not competent to issue direction transferring the case to the High Court Judge and the directions issued in the previous decision were recalled. In the instant cases, the Settlement Commission has jurisdiction and after remitting of the cases they relate back to the stage from which the Settlement Commission has to proceed further. Thus, the decision relied upon in A.R. Antulay’s case (supra) has no relevance. Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting the submission raised by Mr. J.K. Singhi, Sr. Standing Counsel for Income-tax that the cases could not have been remitted to the Settlement Commission for decision afresh.
13. It was also submitted by the counsel appearing on behalf of assessees that the writ applications were filed by the revenue as an afterthought and once the tax was demanded as determined by the Settlement Commission, it was not open to the revenue to prefer the writ applications. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel in Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Asstt. Sales Tax Officer AIR 1961 SC 1325 (V 48 C 243).
14. We are not inclined to accept the said submission, same is liable to be rejected for various reasons. Firstly, it was mandatory to deposit the tax determined by the Settlement Commission as per provisions of section 245D(6A) of the Act within 35 days of the order passed by the Settlement Commission. In our considered opinion, there is no estoppel against the revenue to claim tax which has been determined and to assail the legality of the order determining the tax at the same time. These are two different provisions. There is no estoppel against the statute. The assessees were liable to deposit tax as per mandate of section 245D(6A). Thus, no estoppel was created against the revenue to assail the validity of the order, in case, tax has been deposited so determined/demanded under the illegal orders. The decision relied on by assessees in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh AIR 1961 SC 1327 (V 48 C 244) is not attracted at all as benefit under the decree was obtained with respect to preemption and the pre-emption price was withdrawn after the grant of special leave. The Apex Court has laid down that the appellant was not precluded from continuing the appeal. Thus, decision otherwise also is against the submission raised by learned counsel and is of no help to the assessee.
15. Coming to the submission raised by Mr. J.K. Singhi, Sr. Standing Counsel for Income-tax Department with respect to direction to the Single Bench to make refund along with interest at the rate of 15 per cent, in case, it becomes necessary. Refund has not been ordered, at this stage and liability is to be determined afresh after hearing learned counsel for the parties. Thus, it cannot be said, at this stage, whether refund would be necessary at all or some more amount of tax liability is to be fastened, in our considered opinion, at this stage, it was not appropriate for the Single Bench to quantify the rate of interest a refund has to carry, in case so ordered in future. How much interest tax refund has to carry would arise only when it is necessitated on determination. At that time, question has to be considered whether the rate of interest applicable on refund as per section 245D(6A) at the rate of 15 per cent which the assessees are required to pay, in case, tax is in deficit or the rate of interest is 6 per cent as prescribed under section 244A of the Act is to be applicable. Since the Single Bench has also not dealt with the issue whether section 244A is applicable in case of refund or the provisions of section 245D(6A) of the Act are applicable. We set aside the part of the order with respect to rate of interest on refund, in case, it was ordered to carry the interest at the rate of 15 per cent. We leave the question open to be decided by the Settlement Commission after hearing the parties in accordance with law and this question has to be decided only, in case, refund is ordered.
16. Coming to the bunch of 25 intra-court appeals preferred by the assessees in which Mr. Ranka, Senior Advocate has attracted our attention to the objective behind establishment of the Settlement Commission and submitted that it is not requirement of law for the Settlement Commission to pass reasoned order and the facts mentioned in Para 5 of the order are inadvertent outcome of orders being cyclostyled, in fact there was due consideration of material, the reasons have been given in Para 6 of the order passed in these 25 matters. Before dealing with the aforesaid submission, we deem it appropriate to quote Para 5 of the orders in these 25 matters, which read thus :
“5. At this juncture, it is not practicable for the Commission to examine the records and investigate the case for proper settlement. Even giving adequate opportunity to the applicant and the department, as laid down in section 245D(4) of Income-tax Act, 1961 is not practicable. However, to comply with the directions of the Hon’ble High Court, we hereby pass an order under section 245D(4) of Income-tax Act, 1961, as under.”
On facts, it is not in dispute at Bar that opportunity of hearing was not afforded by Settlement Commission to either of the parties. Only the assessee submitted the written arguments, not the Revenue. Written submissions were not filed by the revenue. No time was granted by the Settlement Commission even to file the written submissions or for oral hearing due to paucity of time. As 31-3-2008 was the cut off date fixed, hence, it was observed that it was not possible for the Settlement Commission to provide opportunity of hearing to the parties. No doubt about it that in Para 6 of the orders there is reference of certain material and there is statement that additional amount has been paid. However, it is apparent from Para 5 of the order that Settlement Commission has observed that it was not practicable to examine the records which was mandatory to investigate the case meaning thereby, to record the evidence necessary for proper settlement. At the same time, it has also been observed that giving opportunity of hearing to the applicant, assessees and the revenue as envisaged under section 245D(4) was not practicable for the Settlement Commission. In fact, no due opportunity was given, hence reasoning, if any, mentioned would not make order legal and valid. Question is that of legality of the action taken in flagrant violation of the provisions under section 245D(4) of the Act as it is not disputed that opportunity of hearing was not afforded. There was no time to give serious look to the record and much less to record the evidence. No enquiry was made. Thus, in our considered opinion, there is flagrant violation of the provisions of section 245D(4) of the Act. The orders so passed are rendered nullity and liable to be set aside. Merely by mentioning of certain material without actively assessing what were the statement etc., cannot be said to be compliance of the provisions of section 245D(4) of the Act. Any finding so recorded in Para 6 of the order without hearing, without investigating and without deeply looking into the record cannot be said to be legal and binding. The procedural safeguards have not been observed as such findings recorded in Para 6 of the orders of these 25 cases also cannot be permitted to survive.
17. The Senior Counsel has referred to the objective of the establishment of the Settlement Commission by referring to the decision in B.N. Bhattachargee’s case (supra) in which the Apex Court has laid down that the purpose of substituting the method of investigative negotiation, just settlement and early eligibility by a high-powered Commission for a tier-upon-tier of long protracted litigation, where victory may be pyrrhic and futile, is ill-served by keeping out cases solely for the reason that departmental appeals have been filed. It is not for the court to explore the intendment of the legislation beyond the language in which the section is couched. The Apex Court has also laid down that Settlement Commission is a Tribunal. Its powers are considerable; its determination affects the rights of parties; its obligations are quasi-judicial; the orders it makes at every stage have tremendous impact on the rights and liabilities of parties. The Apex Court has also observed that it is not inappropriate to state that the policy of the law as disclosed in Chapter-XIX-A is not to provide a rescue shelter for big tax-dodgers who indulge in criminal activities by approaching the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission will certainly take due note of the gravity of economic offences on the wealth of the nation which the Wanchoo Committee had emphasised and will exercise its power of immunisation against criminal prosecutions by using its power only sparingly and in deserving cases; otherwise such orders may become vulnerable if properly challenged. Learned counsel has also relied upon the decision in Om Prakash Mittal’s case (supra) to contend that the Settlement Commission’s power of settlement has to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act. Though the Settlement Commission has sufficient elbow room in assessing the income of the applicant, it cannot make any order with a term of settlement which would be in conflict with the mandatory provisions of the Act like the quantum and payment of tax and interest. The object of the Legislature in introducing section 254C is to see that protracted proceedings before the authorities or in courts are avoided by resorting to settlement of cases. In this process an assessee cannot expect any reduction in amounts statutorily payable under the Act. Reliance has also been placed upon the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Star Television News Ltd.’s case (supra) in which Wanchoo Committee’s recommendations have been quoted in Para 2.33 in which it has been observed that settlement is fair, prompt and independent. Suggestion was made that there should be a high level machinery in administrating the provisions. In our opinion, there is no doubt about it that the Settlement Commission has been established with the aforesaid objectives. At the same time as observed by the Apex Court in Om Prakash Mittal’s case (supra) the Commission was bound to comply with the provisions of statute. No doubt about it that there should not be protraction of the settlement proceedings but at the same time the mandatory provisions are also required to be complied with. Merely under the banner of no protraction of the case, illegality or flagrant violation of the provisions of the Act cannot be permitted to survive. It was incumbent upon the Settlement Commission to act in accordance with the provisions under section 245D(4) of the Act. There has been blatant violation of the said provision in the instant case. Even as per the findings which are recorded in the form of confession, violation of the provision has been made as it was mandatory to comply with the order of the High Court. Orders were passed in due haste. However, the High Court order never meant the Settlement Commission to violate the mandate of the provisions of the Act, it was incumbent upon the Settlement Commission to pass appropriate order in accordance with law. It was incumbent upon the Settlement Commission to follow strictly provisions enumerated in section 245D(4) and other provisions. Consequently, we find that these 25 cases of the assessees are also required to be heard afresh by the Settlement Commission and decided in accordance with law after duly following the mandate of section 245D(4) of the Act.
18. We are of the opinion that no case is made out to interfere in the appeals. Consequently, intra-court appeals, cross objections and stay applications are hereby dismissed. Let the Settlement Commission make an endeavour to decide the cases in accordance with law as far as possible within a period of six months from the date of appearance of the parties. No costs.
[Citation : 336 ITR 174]
