High Court Of Madras
CIT vs. Das Wines & Liquors
Section 260A, 271(1)(a)
Asst. Year 1985-86
V.S. Sirpurkar & C. Nagappan, JJ.
Tax Case (Appeal) No. 269 of 2000
21st April, 2003
Counsel Appeared :
T. Ravikumar, for the Appellant : Ramachandran for M/s. Anitha Sumanth, for the Respondent
JUDGMENT
V. S. SIRPURKAR, J. :
The present appeal is directed against the order of the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal accepted the explanations by the assessee and quashed the penalties which were inflicted by the assessing authority and the CIT(A) under s. 271(1)(a) of the IT Act, 1961.
2. The appeal is at the instance of the Revenue and the following substantial questions of law are canvassed :
“(a) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in cancelling the levy of penalty under s. 271(1)(a) by holding that the habitual default caused by the assessee has no relevance and would not constitute wilful default?
(b) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in holding that the criminal Court’s finding that the assessee is guilty of wilful default and hence punishable under the IT Act, has no relevance to the subject-matter of appeal before them?
(c) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in holding that the explanation offered by the assessee for the first time before the Tribunal for non-filing of the return after various notices were issued is acceptable and that levy of penalty for wilful default can be cancelled?
(d) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in condoning the delay of 660 days in filing the appeal by the assessee?
(e) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in admitting an argument which is based on facts would have certainly been advanced before the AO, the CIT(A) and before the criminal Court?”
The relevant year is 1985-86 and the returns were bound to be filed before 30th June, 1985. This return has ultimately been filed on 14th Dec., 1987, and thereby the assessing authority found that there was no reasonable cause for the assessee not to file the returns in time. In this order, the assessing authority also took notice of the fact that the Department had served as many as eight notices under ss. 139(2) and 142(1) to the assessee, but the assessee had ignored all the notices and had not bothered to file the returns. Ultimately, the said returns came to be filed on 14th Dec., 1987, only, which were delayed by about 2-1/2 years. In that view, the assessing authority passed the order inflicting penalty under s. 271(1)(a). The appeal against this decision failed. However, the Tribunal entertained the appeal though it was delayed and came to the finding that there was reasonable cause for late filing of the return and that the assessee could be let off on the basis of that reasonable cause without penalty. At the outset, it must be said that none of the questions which have been framed in this appeal can be said to be substantial questions of law. After all, under s. 271(1)(a), the concerned authority has to come to the conclusion and has to be satisfied that the assessee has without any reasonable cause failed to furnish the returns which he was required to furnish under sub-s. (1) of s. 139. Therefore, there lies a discretion in the assessing authority or the taxing authorities to appreciate as to whether the assessee had any such reasonable cause where the assessee has failed to file the returns. The language of s. 271(1)(a) is as follows : “271. (1) If the ITO or the AAC or the CIT(A) in the course of any proceedings under this Act, is satisfied that any person— (a) has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the return of total income which he was required to furnish under sub-s. (1) of s. 139 or by notice given under sub-s. (2) of s. 139 or s. 148 or has without reasonable cause failed to furnish it within the time allowed and in the manner required by sub-s. (1) of s. 139 or by such notice, as the case may be, or”
It is obvious that the law poses discretion in the ITO or the AAC or even in the CIT(A) to find out whether there has been a reasonable cause on account of which the assessee had not filed the returns in time. This reasonable cause, therefore, has to be established by the assessee who would give his reasons for not filing the returns and if those reasons can spell out a reasonable cause, then there would be no question of any action under s. 271(1)(a). It is in this background it will have to be said that the appreciation of those facts would not in any manner be a substantial question of law because the facts may differ from case to case. In this case, it is obvious that the returns were not filed in time. It is also obvious that the returns were filed after about 21/2 years and that too after about eight notices having been sent to the assessee. However, while considering the delay, the Tribunal has given a number of reasons. One of the major reasons being that the assessee had closed the business even on 31st May, 1984, and more importantly, the fact that the assessee suffered because of the attitude on the part of its tax consultant. There was an affidavit on record to suggest that the tax consultant and the advocate who were initially looking after the matter did not file the returns, partly owing to ill-health and partly owing to the fact that at the relevant time filing of the returns depended upon the auditor’s report by the chartered accountant. It was pointed out in that order itself that by introduction of s. 44AB, audit was made compulsory and the assessee had shown that it took some time on account of the audit not being completed. It was also pointed out that the information required for completing the audit such as receipts, vouchers, arrack duty, commissions and kist payments to Government which were liable to be obtained from the excise department and even these were not available in time resulting in late filing of the return.
The assessee in this case had supported its version by filing affidavits which affidavits were not controverted by the Department. The Tribunal, therefore, took note of that factor also. In fact, there appears to be an affidavit by the chartered accountant, S. Gopalakrishnan, regarding the requirements of s. 44AB which was not controverted by the Department and there is a reference to that in the Tribunal’s order. Further, it was strenuously contended before the Tribunal that there was habitual ignorance on the part of the assessee for the notices given. However, the Tribunal has pointed out that that factor by itself may not be the only relevant factor for consideration as to whether the returns were delayed for good reasons or not. In short, the Tribunal has taken into account various circumstances to suggest that the delay in filing the returns was for a reasonable cause that would clearly be a question of fact or at the most a mixed question of law and fact and that would never be a substantial question of law. In fact, the Department went to the extent of arguing before the Tribunal that since the assessee was convicted by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Economic Offences, Ernakulam, and the Addl. Sessions Judge, Ernakulam, for deliberately not filing the returns, the Tribunal, in our opinion, rightly has come to the conclusion that the matter would not depend on the findings of the criminal Courts and the Tribunal has to independently consider the same. Ultimately, Mr. Ramachandran, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee, reports that even the convictions recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the Addl. Sessions Judge have been set aside and the assessee stands acquitted.
If the Tribunal has taken a view as it did and if there is nothing perverse in that view, then it could not be said that the Tribunal has committed a substantial error of law. We do not, therefore, find any merit in this appeal. As it is, we are of the clear opinion that the so-called questions of law as drafted in the memo of appeal cannot amount to substantial questions of law. Even on merits, we find that the Tribunal has applied its mind to all the factors argued before it. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. Learned standing counsel for the Department however tried to rely on few reported decisions. They being : (a) Gujarat Travancore Agency vs. CIT (1989) 77 CTR (SC) 174 : (1989) 177 ITR 455 (SC); (b) Addl. CIT vs. I.M. Patel & Co. (1992) 105 CTR (SC) 195 : (1992) 196 ITR 297 (SC); (c) Premier Metal & Engineering Corpn. vs. CIT (2002) 254 ITR 494 (Mad); and (d) CIT vs. Kerala Transport Co. (2002) 172 CTR (Ker) 675 : (2002) 253 ITR 231 (Ker).
These decisions only had a question as to whether for an action under s. 271(1)(a) mens rea is required. That is not a relevant factor in the case pending before us. This is a case where the question is as to whether the Tribunal was right in holding that there was a sufficient cause for delayed filing of the returns. In that view, those judgments would be of no consequence. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. No costs.
[Citation : 267 ITR 74]
