Madras H.C : Where no return of income has been furnished by an assessee, although his total income is above the taxable limit

High Court Of Madras

Jayaram Paper Mills Ltd. vs. CIT & ANR.

Section 147, Expln. 2

Asst. Year 2004-05

V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Writ Petn. No. 20258 of 2009 and Misc. Petn. No. 1 of 2009

10th November, 2009

Counsel Appeared :

S. Sridhar, for the Petitioner : K. Subramaniam, for the Respondents

ORDER

V. Ramasubramanian, J. :

The petitioner has come up with this writ petition challenging a notice issued under s. 148 of the IT Act, 1961 and an order overruling the objections filed by the petitioner to the said notice. I have heard Mr. S. Sridhar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K. Subramaniam, learned standing counsel for the Department. The petitioner is a company, whose main objects, as per the articles and memorandum of association, include the manufacturing and marketing of paper and the business of financing. The company was incorporated in 1974. For the asst. yr. 2004-05 relating to the previous year ending 31st March, 2004, the petitioner filed a return of income on 1st Nov., 2004 disclosing a total income of Rs. 3,02,626. This income was arrived at by the petitioner by showing an income of Rs. 12,80,258 as interest earned in the activity of money-lending, under the head ‘Business’ and afterclaiming admissible expenses and set off as against brought forward losses. However, the second respondent issued a notice dt. 7th July, 2008 under s. 148 of the IT Act, 1961 and called for various details. The petitioner filed objections and requested the respondent to furnish reasons for reopening the assessment. By a letter dt. 30th July, 2009, the second respondent furnished reasons. It was pointed out by the second respondent in that letter that in the return filed by the petitioner, the expenditure unconnected with the earning of interest was found to have been claimed and that brought forward business loss was wrongly set off against income from other sources, contrary to the provisions of s. 72. By a letter dt. 27th Aug., 2009, the petitioner filed objections to the reasoning given by the second respondent and requested the second respondent to drop further proceedings. But by a reply dt. 31st Aug., 2009, the second respondent rejected the request and held that the initiation of proceedings under s. 147 was correct and proper. Therefore, the petitioner is before this Court, challenging the notice under s. 148 of the Act.

It is now well-settled that the term “escaped assessment” includes both non-assessment and under-assessment. [See Tax Officer-Cum-Regional Transport Officer & Ors. vs. Durg Transport Co. (P) Ltd. (1975) 4 SCC 43 and CIT vs. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (1992) 107 CTR (SC) 209 : (1992) 4 SCC 363]. In a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court has held that this Court, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, has power to set aside a notice under s. 147 of the IT Act, 1961, if the conditions precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction do not exist. One of the earliest decisions that arose on the question of reopening of assessment due to income escaping assessment, under s. 34 of the Indian IT Act, 1922 as amended in 1948, was the one in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. vs. ITO AIR 1961 SC 372. The provisions of s. 34 were similar, though not in pari materia to s. 147 of the present Act. By a majority opinion, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held in that case that two pre-conditions are to be satisfied, to confer jurisdiction under the above provision, namely (i) that the ITO must have reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to tax have been under-assessed and (ii) that he must also have reason to believe that such underassessment had occurred by reason of either the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to file a return or omission or failure on the part of an assessee to disclose fully and truly, all material facts necessary for the assessment. In para 8 of the said decision, the Supreme Court held that the section postulates a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts and that the question as to what are material facts, would differ from case to case. The Court further pointed out in para 9 that the Explanation to s. 34 (of the old Act) was inserted “to meet a possible contention that when some account books or other evidence has been produced, there was no duty on the assessee to disclose further facts, which on due diligence, the ITO might have discovered”. The Court held that in view of the Explanation to s. 34, no asssessee would be heard to contend that by disclosing certain evidence, he should be deemed to have disclosed other evidence, which might have been discovered by the assessing authority by pursuing an investigation on the basis of what had been disclosed. However the apex Court also made it clear that once all primary facts are disclosed, it is not necessary for the assessee to render any more assistance by telling the assessing authority what inferences, whether of facts or of law could be drawn.

In the next decision, CIT vs. A. Raman & Co. AIR 1968 SC 49, the apex Court held in para 6—(i) that the Court, in exercise of its powers, can ascertain whether the ITO had in his possession, any information and (ii) that the Court may also determine whether from such information, the ITO may have reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. But the jurisdiction of the Court extends no further. The Supreme Court made it clear that it is for the ITO and not this Court, to decide whether on the information in his possession, he should commence a proceeding for assessment or reassessment and that the ITO alone is entrusted with the power to administer the Act. Elaborating on the reach of the term “reason to believe” appearing in s. 34(1A) of the old Act, it was held in Sheo Nath Singh vs. AAC 1973 CTR (SC) 484 : (1972) 3 SCC 234, that the belief must be that of an honest and reasonable person based upon reasonable grounds and that the ITO may act on direct or circumstantial evidence but not on mere suspicion, gossip or rumour. In Gemini Leather Stores vs. ITO 1975 CTR (SC) 1127 : (1975) 4 SCC 375, the Supreme Court held that if the ITO had all material facts before him when he made the original assessment and if it was plainly a case of oversight on the part of the ITO and the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment not by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, the ITO cannot take recourse to s. 147(a) to remedy the error resulting from his own oversight. Again, in ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das 1976 CTR (SC) 220 : (1976) 3 SCC 757 the Supreme Court pointed out that the duty cast upon the assessee is to make a true and full disclosure of the primary facts at the time of the original assessment. But the Supreme Court also made it clear in that decision that the mere production of the books of account or other evidence from which the ITO could have, with due diligence, discovered material facts, would not necessarily amount to a disclosure contemplated by law. It was held therein that the duty of the assessee does not extend beyond making a true and full disclosure of primary facts and that it was for the ITO to draw a correct inference from those primary facts. If an ITO had drawn an inference which was found subsequently to be erroneous, the mere change of opinion with regard to that inference would not justify the initiation of action for reopening the assessment. After holding so, the apex Court also added a note of caution that once there exist reasonable grounds for the ITO to form the belief, it would be sufficient to clothe him with jurisdiction and that the sufficiency of grounds which induced the ITO to act, is not a justiciable issue. While the existence of the belief can be challenged by the assessee, the sufficiency of reasons for the belief cannot be challenged.

In Ganga Saran & Sons (P) Ltd. vs. ITO (1981) 22 CTR (SC) 112 : (1981) 3 SCC 143, it was again reiterated that before the ITO can assume jurisdiction to issue notice under s. 147(a), two distinct conditions are to be fulfilled namely (i) that he must have reason to believe that the income of the assessee had escaped assessment and (ii) that he must have reason to believe that such escapement was by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts necessary for the assessment. The apex Court also pointed out that the belief entertained by the ITO must not be arbitrary or irrational, but must be based on reasons which are relevant and material. In Indian Oil Corporation vs. ITO (1986) 58 CTR (SC) 83 : (1986) 3 SCC 409, the Supreme Court indicated that s. 147(a) postulates a duty on every assessee, firstly to disclose facts; secondly, those which are material; thirdly, the disclosure must be full and fourthly, true. What facts are material and necessary for assessment, will differ from case to case. Referring to the scope of operation of cls. (a) and (b) of s. 147, the Supreme Court held in Niranjan & Co. (P) Ltd. vs. CIT (1986) 52 CTR (SC) 270 : (1986) Supp. SCC 272 that reopening under s. 147 can only be made after completed assessment if the ITO has reason to believe undercl. (a) that by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return or to disclose fully or truly all relevant facts, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year. Reopening is also possible under cl. (b) notwithstanding that there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee, if the ITO has in consequence of information in his possession, reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Dwelling on the circumstances under which the reopening may not amount to a mere change of opinion, the Supreme Court held in Phool Chand Bajrang Lal vs. ITO (1993) 113 CTR (SC) 436 : (1993) 4 SCC 77 that the ITO may start reassessment proceedings either because some fresh facts come to light which were not previously disclosed or some information with regard to the facts previously disclosed comes into his possession which tends to expose the untruthfulness of those facts. In such situations, it is not a case of mere change of opinion or the drawing of a different inference from the same facts.

After tracing the law on the point right from the earliest decision of the Constitution Bench in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. (supra) and while agreeing with the decision in Phool Chand Bajrang Lal (supra), the Supreme Court held in Sri Krishna (P) Ltd. vs. ITO (1996) 135 CTR (SC) 75 : (1996) 9 SCC 534 that the existence of the reasons to believe is supposed to be the check, a limitation, upon the power to reopen assessment and that ss. 148(2) and 151 impose further checks by respectively prescribing (i) the requirement to record reasons and (ii) the requirement for the CIT to satisfy himself that it was a fit case for the issue of a notice. Therefore the power conferred upon the ITO was held by the apex Court to have been hedged with several safeguards conceived in the interest of eliminating room for abuse of this power by the AOs. In Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. vs. ITO (1999) 152 CTR (SC) 418 : (1999) 236 ITR 34 (SC), assessment was reopened on the ground that the assessee was charging to its P&L a/c, fiscal duties paid during the year as well as labour charges, power, fuel, wages, chemicals etc., and that however, while valuing its closing stock, the elements of fiscal duty and the other direct manufacturing costs were not included. The reason for reopening was that such non-inclusion resulted in undervaluation of inventories and understatement of profits. When a challenge was made, the Supreme Court rejected it on the ground that the Court could only see whether there was prima facie some material on the basis of which the assessment could be reopened and that the sufficiency or correctness of the material cannot be considered. The Court made it clear that it would be open to the assessee to prove the assumption of the AO to be erroneous and that there were no new facts, while participating in the proceedings.

Indicating the procedure to be followed in cases where a notice under s. 148 is issued, the Supreme Court held in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. ITO (2003) 179 CTR (SC) 11 : (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC) that when a notice under s. 148 is issued, the proper course of action for the noticee is to file a return and if he so desires, to seek reasons for issuing notice. The AO is then obliged to furnish reasons, after receipt of which, the noticee can file objections. Thereafter, the AO is bound to pass a speaking order disposing of the objections. Having thus seen the broad canvas on which the Courts have painted the nature and scope of the power under s. 148, right from the Constitution Bench decision in Calcutta Discount Co. (supra), upto GKN Driveshafts (supra), let us now take a look at s. 147 of the Act. It reads as follows : “147. Income escaping assessment—If the AO has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year he may, subject to the provisions of ss. 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in this section and in ss. 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year) : Provided that where an assessment under sub-s. (3) of s. 143 or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under s. 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub-s. (1) of s. 142 or s. 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, for that assessment year : Provided further that the AO may assess or reassess such income other than the income involving matters which are the subject-matter of any appeal, reference or revision, which is chargeable to tax and has escaped assessment.

Explanation 1.—Production before the AO of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the AO will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the foregoing proviso. Explanation 2.—For the purpose of this section, the following shall also be deemed to be cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, namely : (a) Where no return of income has been furnished by the assessee although his total income or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax; (b) Where a return of income has been furnished by the assessee but no assessment has been made and it is noticed by the AO that the assessee has understated the income or has claimed excessive loss, deduction, allowance or relief in the return; (c) Where an assessment has been made, but (i) such income has been assessed at too low a rate; or (ii) income chargeable to tax has been under-assessed; or (iii) such income has been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act; or (iv) excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allowance under this Act has been computed.” Sec. 147 underwent a substantial change, first by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 (Act 4 of 1988) and later by other amendments. Prior to the amendment in 1988, s. 147 contained cls. (a) and (b) and Explns. 1 and 2. After amendment, cls. (a) and (b) have been deleted and Expln. 2 has taken a new shape. The Expln. 2, as it stands today, creates a deeming fiction in 3 types of situations namely (i) when no return is filed even though the total income exceeds the maximum amount; (ii) when a return of income is filed but no assessment has been made and the AO notices either an understatement of the income or a claim for excessive loss, deduction, allowance or relief in the return; and (iii) where an assessment had been made but there is either understatement of income or assessment at a lower rate or grant of excessive relief or the computation of excessive loss or depreciation or other allowance. Even before the amendment under Act 4 of 1988, there was a deeming fiction in s. 147 under Expln.1. But the import of the same was not so much as it is under Expln. 2 inserted after the amendment. Prior to theDirect Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988, s. 147 reads as follows : “Sec. 147. Income escaping assessment- If— (a) the AO has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under s. 139 for any assessment year to the AO or to disclose fully and truly, all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or (b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure to as mentioned in cl. (a) on the part of the assessee, the AO has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of ss. 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment yearconcerned (hereafter in ss. 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year). Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section, the following shall also be deemed to be cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, namely : (a) where income chargeable to tax has been under-assessed; or (b) where such income has been assessed at too low a rate; or (c) where such income has been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act or under the Indian IT Act, 1922 (11 of 1922); or (d) where excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed. Explanation 2.—Production before the AO of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the AO will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of this section.”

After the aforesaid amendment under Act 4 of 1988, yet another amendment was made by Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989 and the words “for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, is of the opinion”, appearing in the first line of s. 147, was substituted by the words “has reason to believe”. Thus a substantial change has been made to s. 147 by the amendments of the years 1988 and 1989. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Bill, 1987 (which became Act 4 of 1988), it was indicated in para 2(i) that in view of the proposed amendment, no assessment order would generally be required to be passed, once the acknowledgement of return of income was issued and that however if a return of income is scrutinised, the process of investigation will be initiated. In the Notes on Clauses, explaining in detail, the provisions of the Bill, it was stated, in relation to the proposed amendments to ss. 147 and 148, as follows : “Clause 54 seeks to substitute new sections for the existing ss. 147 and 148 relating to income escaping assessment and issue of notice on such escapement of income. Clause (a) of the existing section empowers the ITO to assess or reassess the income escaping assessment, if he has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment and such escapement has occurred on account of either assessee’s omission or failure to file a return of income or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year. Clause (b) empowers the ITO to reopen an assessment, notwithstanding the fact that there is no omission or failure, as mentioned in cl. (a) on the part of the assessee, if he has, in consequence of information in his possession, reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Under the proposed amendment, separate provisions contained in the existing cls. (a) and (b) of the section are to be simplified and merged into a single provision enabling the AO to assess or reassess income which has escaped assessment for any assessment year, after recording reasons for doing so. The existing requirements of having “reason to believe” or “information in possession”, are dispensed with. It is further provided in the new section that once an assessment is reopened, any other income which has escaped assessment and which comes to the notice of the AO subsequently in the course of the proceeding under this section, can also be included in the assessment.

A proviso to the new sub-section provides that if an assessment has been made for the relevant assessment year under sub-s. (3) of s. 143 or this section, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the income has escaped assessment due to the failure on the part of the assessee to file a return under s. 139 or 142(1) or 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. Explanation 1 to the new section, which clarifies the meaning of the term ‘disclosure’, is the same as Expln. 2 in the existing section. Explanation 2 to the new section clarifies that the following shall also be deemed to be cases of income escaping assessment : (i) Where no return of income has been furnished by an assessee, although his total income is above the taxable limit; (ii) Where a return of income has been furnished but no assessment has been made, and the assessee is found to have understand his income or claimed excessive loss, deduction, etc., in the return; and (iii) Where an assessment has been made, but income chargeable to tax has been under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate or any excessive loss or relief or depreciation allowance or any other allowance under the Act has been allowed.

The existing provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 148 provide that a notice issued under this section shall tantamount to a notice issued under sub-s. (2) of s. 139. The existing sub-s. (2) provides that before issuing a notice under this section, the ITO will record his reasons for doing so. In the new s. 148, reference to sub-s. (2) of s. 139 is to be removed as that sub-section is being deleted. Sub-s. (2) of the section is to be deleted, as the requirement of recording reasons is incorporated in s. 147 itself. The new s. 148, therefore, provides that before making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation under s. 147, the AO shall serve on the assessee, a notice requiring him to furnish the return of income within such period, not being less than 30 days, as may be specified in the notice.” Thus it is clear that the scope of the deeming fiction which was found in Expln. 1 under s. 147, before its amendment, was enlarged in the form of Expln. 2, by the amendment under Act 4 of 1988. The effect of this deeming fiction did not fall for consideration in any of the decisions that arose even upto Sri Krishna (P) Ltd. (supra). Therefore, even while keeping in mind the elementary principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, we may have to apply them to the extent that they are now permissible in view of the Expln. 2. By virtue of Expln.2— (i) non-furnishing of return by an assessee, whose total income is above the ceiling limit, will be deemed to be a case of income escaping assessment; (ii) understatement of income or a claim of excessive loss, deduction, allowance or relief in the return furnished by the assessee, will also be deemed to be a case of income escapingassessment, in cases where a return is filed but no assessment is made; (iii) underassessment of income chargeable to tax, assessment of income at too low a rate, grant of excessive relief under the Act to an income and the computation of excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allowance, would also be deemed to be a case of income escaping assessment, in cases where an assessment has been made.

In the light of the above deeming fiction, if we now look at the order dt. 31st Aug., 2009, passed by the second respondent, overruling the objections of the petitioner to the initiation of proceedings, it is seen that the petitioner admittedly earned income solely from interest on fixed deposits and inter-corporate deposits and debited significant amount of expenditure. The AO has taken a stand, prima facie, that the expenditure debited to the P&L a/c under various heads are not incidental to the earning of interest income. Therefore the stand taken by the second respondent that he has reason to believe that certain income chargeable to tax escaped assessment, cannot be said to be vague, irrational or devoid of any basis. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon two decisions, one, of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court and another of the Division Bench of this Court. In KLM Royal Dutch Airlines vs. Asstt. Director of IT (2007) 208 CTR (Del) 33 : (2007) 292 ITR 49 (Del) relied upon by the learned counsel, a notice under s. 148 was issued on the ground that the income earned by rendering technical services cannot be claimed by the airlines, as covered by art. 8 of the DTAA. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court found that the assessee had filed a return under s. 139 on 31st Oct., 2002 and that since no order of assessment had been finalised by the AO, there was no scope for initiating proceedings for “reassessment”. The focus of the Delhi High Court was on the word “reassessment”, in the light of the fact that in that case, an inquiry had been initiated after scrutiny by the AO. Though the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, relying upon a Full Bench decision of the very same Court in CIT vs. Kalvinator of India Ltd. (2002) 174 CTR (Del)(FB) 617 : (2002) 256 ITR 1 (Del)(FB) also held that the amendment to s. 147 w.e.f. 1st April, 1989 had not altered the position insofar as the law relating to change of opinion was concerned, the purport of the deeming fiction did not arise for consideration in that case. Therefore, the decision of the Delhi High Court does not assist the petitioner. In Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT (2008) 220 CTR (Mad) 335 : (2008) 15 DTR (Mad) 137 : (2008) 305 ITR 339 (Mad), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Division Bench of this Court was concerned with a notice issued under s. 148, after the expiry of 5 years from the assessment year. The Division Bench found that in that case, the assessment was originally completed under s. 143(3) on 28th March, 2003, by the Asstt. CIT, Circle-2(3), Mumbai, in respect of the asst. yr. 2000-01. Subsequently the case was transferred to the Company Circle, Chennai. The Company Circle, Chennai, allegedly received information from the Enforcement Directorate that the assessee had given some orders of import, but failed to produce the original bills of entry. On the basis of the said information, the Dy. CIT suspected that there was every chance of inflated expenditure being booked on account of import. When the suspicion was brought to the notice of the CIT, the CIT granted approval for the issue of notice under s. 148. Upon perusal of the reasons recorded and the communications between the Dy. CIT and CIT, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that what was raised by the Revenue was only a “doubt” and not a “specific finding” and that the AO failed to record (i) that he had reasons to believe that there was underassessment and (ii) that such underassessment had occurred by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee.

But in the case on hand, the reason recorded by the second respondent cannot be said to be vague or a mere doubt. From the return of income filed by the petitioner, the AO had found that the petitioner had earned interest on deposits to the tune of Rs. 12,80,258 and that they sought deduction of a sum of Rs. 9,26,830.84 towards admissible expenses that included the general administrative expenses, vehicle maintenance, salaries etc. The losses brought forward from the previous assessment years were also set off and the petitioner claimed a total income of only Rs. 3,02,626.16. It is this that prompted the second respondent to issue a notice under s. 148 and hence on facts, the case of the petitioner is patently distinguishable from the one in Sterlite Industries case (supra). Moreover, Expln. 2 was not in issue in Sterlite Industries case (supra). Therefore, that case is of no assistance to the petitioner. In any event, the petitioner is only at the threshold. Once it is found that the AO had reason to believe that there was income escaping assessment, it is not open to this Court to make a roving enquiry, since the reasons are not justiciable. All that can happen, by allowing the proceedings to continue, is that the AO may pass an order of assessment or reassessment. The petitioner would then have a spate of statutory remedies. Therefore, the case on hand, in my opinion, is not one that warrants interference at this stage. In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.

[Citation : 321 ITR 56]

Scroll to Top
Malcare WordPress Security