Madras H.C : The case of the prosecution is that Appu Hotels Ltd., Chennai, was the owner of the lands situate at door No. 1, West Cott Road, Royapettah, in an extent of ten grounds and 1,267 square feet

High Court Of Madras

R. Vijayalakshmi vs. Appu Hotels Ltd. & Ors.

Section 276AB

A.K. Rajan, J.

Crl. Appeal No. 181 of 1993

1st July, 2002

Counsel Appeared

K. Ramaswamy, for the Appellant : S. Ashok Kumar, for the Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 : P.S. Raman, for the Respondent Nos. 3 & 4

JUDGMENT

A.K. RAJAN, J. :

This appeal is against the acquittal. The case of the prosecution is that Appu Hotels Ltd., Chennai, was the owner of the lands situate at door No. 1, West Cott Road, Royapettah, in an extent of ten grounds and 1,267 square feet; they purchased the property on 15th April, 1987, for a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs. The third respondent, Sunil Estates, which is a partnership firm, entered into an agreement to put up construction in the property and thereafter, take 50 per cent, of the constructed area and adjust for the amount invested by the third respondent. While that be so, the ground over the constructed area also could be sold by the third respondent. This amounts to transfer of ownership with respect to 50 per cent of the immovable property, as per Chapter XX-C of the IT Act, 1961. Since the value of such property exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs, accused Nos. 1 and 3 should have informed the Appropriate Authority constituted under the IT Act, at least three months prior to such transfer, as per s. 269UC and they should have submitted Form No. 37-I, within 15 days from the date of the agreement. Therefore, accused Nos. 1 and 3 and their managers, accused Nos. 2 and 4 are also punishable for the contravention of ss. 269UA, 269UB and 269UL of the Act. Since they did not get “No Objection Certificate” from the Appropriate Authority, they have committed offence punishable under s. 276AB. The Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who heard the case found the accused not guilty of the charge and acquitted all the accused. Aggrieved by the acquittal of the accused, this appeal has been preferred.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court has come to the conclusion that there was no transfer of immovable property and hence acquitted the accused. The trial Court has not considered the terms of the agreement properly and it has not considered the provisions of s. 269UA, cls. (f) and (e) and also ss. 269UC and 269UD. In support of his contention, he relies upon the decision in Appropriate Authority vs. Smt. Varshaben Bharatbhai Shah (2001) 166 CTR (SC) 373 : (2001) 248 ITR 342 (SC), where co-owners entered into a similar agreement of transfer of property agreeing to transfer the definite share of each owner, the Supreme Court held that : “Looked at realistically, it was the immovable property which was the subject matter of transfer.” Therefore, the property to be transferred is the entire property and where the value of the property exceeds the specified limit, ss. 269UA, 269UC and 269UD of the IT Act apply and therefore, Form No. 37-I should have been filed. He relies upon another judgment of the Madras High Court in Ashok Leyland Finance Ltd. vs. Appropriate Authority (1997) 140 CTR (Mad) 346 : (1998) 230 ITR 398 (Mad) : TC 68R.141, where this Court has held that :

“Notwithstanding the description of the document as a development agreement, the subject matter of the transfer being an undivided share in the land, and the consideration being partly in money and partly in a ‘thing’ which was not in existence, the thing being a flat which the transferee was required to construct, the provisions of Chapter XX-C of the Act were attracted.” Therefore, counsel submitted that even though it is a transfer of future construction, even to such development agreement, the provisions of Chapter XX-C apply. He also relies upon the decision in Shantivan Corporation vs. Sub-Registrar (1990) 90 CTR (Guj) 196 : (1991) 189 ITR 583 (Guj) : TC 3R.1007, where it was held : “The fact that allowing the possession of such property to be taken or retained in part performance is also included in the expression, ‘transfer’ in cl. (f) of s. 269UA so as to prevent even such passing of possession.”

Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the agreement if read, bearing these principles in mind, proves that ownership of 50 per cent, of the land has already been transferred. The provisions of the IT Act which is a special provision apply, notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act. Hence, the respondents are guilty of violation of the provisions of the IT Act. Hence, the acquittal of the accused is not valid and hence, it is liable to be set aside.

Counsel for the respondents submitted that there is no transfer of property at all. A transfer of immovable property of value above Rs. 100 cannot be made without a registered deed. What is contemplated under the agreement is an agreement to build a construction over the property and to hand it over to the owner of the land. By sale of such proposed constructed area, both the owner of the land and the builder who put up the superstructure will take their respective shares. In so far as the agreement that has been entered into, there is no transfer of any interest in the immovable property. There is no buyer or seller in that agreement. It is only a licence given to the builder to construct. The ultimate aim is only to share the profit, it is purely a business transaction and no transfer of interest in the immovable property is involved. A perusal of the agreement shows that the possession of the properties was given to the builder for putting up construction for a specified period. Therefore, it is not a permanent transfer so as to attract the provisions of Chapter XX-C. Further, the purpose for which these sections in Chapter XX-C were enacted was to prevent avoidance of stamp duty by undervaluing the property. Further, the purpose of submitting of Form No. 37-I is to enable the IT Department to purchase the property on the same price as found in the agreement. Assuming that the Government wanted to use the right of pre-emptive purchase, this property has to be taken over by the Government on the price fixed. But, in the present case, no sale price is mentioned. Hence, there is no question of purchase for the “agreed amount.” Therefore, the right of pre-emptive purchase cannot be exercised at all by the Department or by the Appropriate Authority in cases of such development agreements. Under s. 269UC proceedings for acquisition may be taken when the competent authority has reason to believe that any immovable property has been transferred for a consideration less than the fair market value and the consideration stated in the instrument is with an object of facilitating reduction or evasion of tax. It is also provided that no such proceedings shall be initiated unless the competent authority has reason to believe that the fair market value of the property exceeds by more than 15 per cent. the apparent consideration. The entire Chapter XX-C is a single code; s. 269UA(f) cannot be read in isolation; it has to be read together with s. 269UC. The Appropriate Authority has not stated that this is a transfer for a value which is less than 15 per cent of the fair market of the property ; it is to be seen that the value of the property has not been stated anywhere in the agreement. Therefore, the act of the respondents is not punishable, even if there is “transfer” within the meaning of s. 269UA(f) of the IT Act. Further, there is no evasion of stamp duty, as there is no transfer of ownership at all. Ultimately, when the properties are sold, stamp duty is payable, as per the market value. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the stamp duty has been evaded or any attempt to evade has been made by entering into such agreement. In the circumstances, the development agreement does not attract the penal provisions of the IT Act.

This is a case where the trial Court has come to a decision based on the records. The conclusion arrived at by the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse. Even if there is a possibility for this Court to come to a different conclusion, where two views are possible, the conclusion of the trial Court cannot be set aside in an appeal against acquittal. Since this is an appeal against acquittal, that conclusion of the trial Court cannot be set aside and hence, this appeal is liable to be dismissed.

In the result, this appeal is dismissed.

[Citation : 257 ITR 4]

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