High Court Of Karnataka
T.S. Raghavan vs. Appropriate Authority & Ors.
Sections 269UG, 269UH, ART. 226
Tirath S. Thakur & Huluvadi G. Ramesh, JJ.
Writ Appeal No. 5266 of 1999
5th April, 2004
Counsel Appeared
Ms. S. Nithya for K.R. Prasad, for the Appellant : M.V. Seshachala & A.R. Desai, for the Respondents
JUDGMENT
Tirath S. Thakur, J. :
This writ appeal arises out of an order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court whereby W.P. No. 26455 of 1993 filed by the appellant, herein has been dismissed and an order of pre-emptive purchase of property passed by respondent-Appropriate Authority under s. 269UD(1) of the IT Act, 1961 upheld.
2. The controversy arises in the following backdrop : In terms of an agreement dt. 11th Dec., 1992, respondent No. 3 in this appeal who happened to be the owner of property bearing No. 28-29 situated in 12th ‘D’ Main Road, 6th Block, Rajajinagar, Bangalore, agreed to sell the same to the appellant herein for a total consideration of Rs. 14,50,000. A sum of Rs. 3 lakhs representing part payment of the sale price was paid by the appellant to the vendor of the property aforementioned. Since however the consideration fixed was beyond the stipulated amount, the parties appear to have filed Form No. 37-I before the Appropriate Authority in accordance with the provisions of Chapter-XXC of the IT Act, 1961 for permission to complete the transaction in terms of the agreement. The Appropriate Authority upon consideration of the said request issued a notice to the parties to the agreement proposing to preemptively purchase the property in question under s. 269UD of the IT Act and calling upon the parties to show-cause why an appropriate order to that effect be not made by it. The appellant-purchaser of the property submitted a reply to the said notice which was considered by the Authority while making an order under s. 269UD(1) of the Act. In the order made by it, the Appropriate Authority recorded a finding to the effect that, while the agreement entered into by the parties intended to transfer the property at the rate of Rs. 213 per sq. ft., the market value of the said property was around Rs. 400 per sq. ft. The Appropriate Authority while saying so drew a comparison between the sale consideration settled by the parties on the one hand and the sale of similar other properties situate in Rajajinagar and Vijayanagar areas of Bangalore city on the other. In due course, the Chief CIT issued a letter dt. 22nd April,1993, requesting respondent No. 3– owner of the property to hand over possession of the same and to collect the consideration payable to him in terms of the sale agreement. Before, however, the owner could respond to the said communication, one Mr. K. Sheshadri addressed a letter dt. 24th April, 1993, to the Chief CIT received in the latter’s office on 26th April, 1993, inter alia, pointing out that he was in occupation of the property as a tenant for the past several years. The communication pointed out that since the property being purchased by the Appropriate Authority was subject to the right of tenancy held by him, any purchase would also be subject to the said encumbrance. The communication also found fault with the proposed pre-emptive purchase of the property by the Appropriate Authority and prayed for either setting aside of the entire process set into motion or to allow Sri. Sheshadri to continue in the premises as a tenant under the Central Government. Four days after the receipt of the said communication, the Chief CIT deposited the entire amount of consideration payable to the owner in terms of the agreement to sell before the Appropriate Authority in the purported discharge of his obligation to do so under s. 269UG of the IT Act. Shortly after the said deposit on 25th May, 1993, the owner of the property filed an application purporting to be one under s. 269UG(4) of the IT Act with a request that the entire amount deposited by the Chief CIT be invested in a fixed deposit. Three months later, on 19th Aug., 1993, the owner refunded to the appellant herein the advance amount of Rs. 3 lakhs received from him in pursuance of the agreement to sell. Sometime later, on 8th Sept., 1993, the Appropriate Authority directed the release of the apparent consideration determined by it in favour of the owner who received the same without protest and in full and final settlement of his claim.
The property in question was three years later sold by the IT Department in a public auction for a sum of Rs. 34,10,000 in favour of M/s Manipal Sowbhagyanidhi Ltd., Writ Petn. No. 26455 of 1993 had in the meantime been filed by the appellant herein before this Court challenging the validity of the order of pre-emptive purchase made by the Appropriate Authority under s. 269UD of the IT Act. The petition came up for hearing before our esteemed brother V.K. Singhal, J., who by his order dt. 27th May, 1999, dismissed the same holding that the supervisory jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution did not extend to substituting the opinion of the Court for that of the Appropriate Authority on matters involving appreciation of relevant evidence and material. Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Appropriate Authority vs. Smt. Sudha Patil (1998) 150 CTR (SC) 405 : (1999) 235 ITR 118 (SC), the Court held that interference with the order passed by the Appropriate Authority would be justified only in cases where the Appropriate Authority had failed to consider some material that was relevant or taken into consideration, material that was extraneous or irrelevant or in cases where the finding recorded by the Authority was without any evidence whatsoever. The case at hand was not, in the opinion of the learned single Judge, one where interference could on any one of those grounds be justified. The Court held that even if two views were possible on a proper appreciation of the relevant material available before the Appropriate Authority, the same could not justify interference with the view taken by the said authority. The present appeal filed by the agreement-holderappellant herein assails the correctness of the said judgment and order.
1. Appearing for the appellant Ms. S. Nithya, strenuously argued that the view taken by the learned single Judge was erroneous hence unsustainable. She contended that the learned single Judge had failed to appreciate that apart from other grounds, the petitioner had assailed the validity of the impugned order of pre-emptive purchase on the ground that the requirement of s. 269UG(1) had not been satisfied in the instant case. She contended that in terms of s. 269UG(1) of the Act, the amount of consideration payable in accordance with the provisions of s. 269UF had to be tendered to the person or persons entitled thereto within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the immovable property concerned became vested in the Central Government under sub-s. (1) or as the case may be under sub-s. (6) of s. 269UE. Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Asgar S. Patel & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 160 CTR (SC) 307, she argued that the amount paid by a buyer for purchase of the property constituted a charge on the property forming the subject-matter of sale to the extent of the amount paid by him. The prospective purchaser of the property under the sale agreement was, therefore, one of the persons entitled to receive the amount of consideration referred to in s. 269UG of the Act. No amount, leave alone Rs. 3 lakhs, which the appellant had paid to the seller of the property was at any stage offered to the appellant. She further argued that in terms of s. 269UG(2) of the Act, the amount of consideration could be deposited with the Appropriate Authority only in case there was any dispute as to the apportionment of the amount of consideration among persons claiming to be entitled thereto. So also, in terms of sub-s. (3) to s. 269UG, such a deposit could be made before the Appropriate Authority only if a person entitled to the amount of consideration did not consent to receive it or if there was any dispute as to his or their title to do so. None of these contingencies having arisen in the instant case, deposit of the sale consideration by the Central Government before the Appropriate Authority was not proper nor even a substantial compliance with the provisions of s. 269UG of the Act. In cases where the amount of consideration was not paid or deposited in accordance with the provisions of s. 269UG, the provisions of s. 269UH would become operative to re-vest the property in question in the transferor upon the expiry of the statutory period prescribed for making the payment or deposit as the case may be. The consequence flowing from non- compliance with the requirements of s. 269UG had, therefore, according to the learned counsel resulted in abrogation of the order of pre-emptive purchase and re-vesting of the property in the transferor. The fact that the property had in the meantime been sold in a public auction did not according to the learned counsel make any material difference as any such sale or transfer was subject to the result of the writ petition that was pending before the learned single Judge of which the present appeal is only a logical extension. It was submitted that the writ jurisdiction of this Court was wide enough to ensure that an undeserved benefit did not flow to any party no matter the beneficiary is a statutory authority or the Central Government as in the instant case. This Court according to the learned counsel could intervene even at this stage to ensure that the ownership of the property is transferred in favour of the appellant upon his paying the settled consideration of Rs. 14,50,000 to the vendor of the property.
2. On behalf of the respondents–Union of India and the Appropriate Authority, it was on the other hand argued by Mr. Seshachala that the writ petition as also the present appeal had in the light of the subsequent developments including the sale of the property in a public auction become infructuous. It was argued by the learned counsel that the property in question had been transferred in favour of M/s Manipal Sowbhagyanidhi Ltd., for a consideration of Rs. 34,10,000 which sale could not at this belated stage be reversed or interfered with. Relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in C.B. Gautam vs. Union of India & Ors. (1992) 108 CTR (SC) 304 r/w (1993) 110 CTR (SC) 179 : (1993) 199 ITR 530 (SC), Union of India vs. Shatabadi Trading & Investment (P) Ltd. & Ors. (2001) 169 CTR (SC) 408 : (2001) 251 ITR 93 (SC), and two decisions of this Court in W.P. Nos. 17705 of 1991, dt. 17th Feb., 1992 and W.P. Nos. 247-248 of 1988, dt. 27th April, 1998, it was argued that the Supreme Court as also this Court had consistently declined to interfere with transfers effected in favour of third parties for consideration even when such transfers were made during the pendency of writ petitions filed to challenge the pre-emptive purchase orders. It was also contended that the appellant- purchaser in the instant case had received the amount paid by him to the seller and that no real prejudice had been caused to him on account of the pre-emptive purchase of the property in terms of the impugned order passed by the Appropriate Authority. The writ jurisdiction could not in such circumstances be exercised to unsettle the settled position especially when interference with the transfer made during the pendency of these proceedings would cause considerable prejudice to an innocent third party. Alternatively, it was argued by Mr. Seshachala, that the objection raised by the appellant to the deposit of the sale consideration with the Appropriate Authority was untenable both on facts and in law. He argued that the agreement to sell executed between the appellant on the one hand and respondent No. 3 on the other entitled the appellant to the property in question free of all encumbrances whatsoever. In the course of the proceedings before the Appropriate Authority, however, it was noticed that the property was not actually free from any encumbrance and that Sri. Sheshadri had claimed and was in occupation of the same as a tenant. The said Sri. Sheshadri had, as noticed earlier, claimed the right to continue as a tenant in the property under the Central Government. In the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court in C.B. Gautam’s case (supra), argued the learned counsel, the consideration referred to in the sale agreement would represent the value of the encumbrances also. This would imply that the seller had to separately satisfy and settle all claims qua the property including the one made by Sri. Sheshadri. Since, however, no such settlement was reported to the Appropriate Authority and since a dispute regarding the entitlement of the owner to receive the amount was implicit in the objections raised by Sri. Sheshadri, the only option which the Central Government had in the circumstances was to deposit the amount with the Appropriate Authority. Inasmuch as the Central Government adopted that course and deposited the amount of consideration within the stipulated period before the Appropriate Authority, it did not commit any mistake nor was there a failure of the requirements of s. 269UG. It was also contended by Mr. Seshachala that non-deposit or short deposit of the amount of consideration within the stipulated period prescribed for the same had to be distinguished from an irregular deposit of the amount. Even assuming that there was any irregularity in making of the deposit, the same did not go to the root of the matter so as to nullify the order of pre- emptive purchase.
1. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made at the Bar and perused the record.
2. The material facts are not in dispute. It is not in dispute that the property in question was agreed to be sold by its owner-respondent No. 3 herein for a total consideration of Rs. 14.50 lakhs in favour of the appellant. It is also not disputed that pursuance to the said agreement, the appellant had paid and the respondent No. 3 had received a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs. That the Appropriate Authority found the consideration settled for the proposed sale inadequate justifying the pre-emptive purchase is also evident from the facts narrated earlier. The Appropriate Authority had justified its decision on the basis of the material placed before it including the comparable sale transactions which according to the Authority showed that the prevailing market value of the property was much higher than what was agreed to be paid and received in pursuance of the agreement. Although an effort was made before the learned single Judge to show that the conclusion drawn by the Appropriate Authority regarding the adequacy of the sale consideration was not justified, no such attempt was made before us by learned counsel for the appellant. The only question that was strenuously and at considerable length argued before us related to the compliance by the Central Government with the mandatory requirements of s. 269UG. Sec. 269UG, as already noticed earlier, requires the Central Government to tender the amount of consideration payable in accordance with s. 269UF to the person or persons entitled within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the immovable property concerned vested in the Central Government under sub-s. (1), or, as the case may be, sub-s. (6) of s. 269UE. The property in question had vested in the Central Government on 23rd March, 1993, i.e., the date on which the order of pre-emptive purchase was made by the Appropriate Authority. The period of one month referred to in s. 269UG had, therefore, to be calculated from 31st March, 1993. In other words, the Central Government was in terms of s. 269UG required to tender the apparent consideration as determined by the Appropriate Authority on or before the 30th April, 1993. That the apparent consideration determined by the authority was Rs. 14,20,130 is not disputed nor is it disputed that the said amount was deposited by the Central Government on 30th April, 1993. The only question that remains to be examined is whether this deposit was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of s. 269UG. The appellant’s contention precisely speaking is that the law requires the amount of apparent consideration to be tendered to the person or persons entitled to receive the same, deposit of such consideration with the Appropriate Authority being permissible only in situations envisaged by sub-ss. (2) and (3) to s. 269UG. The said provision envisages three distinct situations in which the Central Government can instead of tendering the amount of apparent consideration to the person entitled to receive the same, deposit such consideration before the Appropriate Authority. The first situation in which this can be done is where a dispute arises as to the apportionment of the consideration among the persons claiming to be entitled to the same. The second situation in which the deposit is permissible relates to the cases in which the person entitled to receive the amount of consideration does not consent to receive the same. The third situation where the deposit may be made are cases in which there is any dispute as to the title of the person receiving the amount of consideration. It is not the case of the respondents that a deposit had become necessary because the persons entitled to receive the same had declined to do so. What was argued by Mr. Seshachala was that the deposit had become necessary because the right of the owner who received the amount representing the apparent consideration was in dispute on account of the dispute which the tenant in occupation of the property had raised. This dispute, it was submitted, necessarily extended to the entitlement of the owner to receive the consideration. Reliance in support of that submission was placed by learned counsel upon a Division Bench decision of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Mrs. Sooni Rustam Mehta & Ors. vs. Appropriate Authority (1991) 98 CTR (AP) 84 : (1991) 190 ITR 290 (AP). In that case, the Court was examining the meaning of the word ‘dispute’ appearing in sub-s. (3) to s. 269UG of the IT Act, 1961. In the absence of any statutory definition of what would constitute a ‘dispute’, the Court relied upon the literal meaning of the said expression and held that the expression must be understood in the widest possible sense and should imply any controversy as to title to the property or the right to receive the consideration for the same. The Court observed that just because there was no rival claimant to the consideration, s. 269UG(3) did not necessarily compel the Authority to tender the apparent consideration determined under s. 269UG(1) of the Act. If the authorities had a bona fide or genuine doubt as to the title of the appellant-vendor, it was open to them not to tender consideration under sub-s. (1) of s. 269UG of the Act but to make deposit under s. 269UG(3). The claimant had in that case challenged the order passed by the Appropriate Authority apart from challenging the vires of the provisions under which the order was made. The Court held that so long as the challenge to the validity of the order and the legal provisions was pending in the Court, the petitioner had no right to receive the amount of consideration especially when recovery of the amount may become difficult if the writ petitions were to succeed. The word ‘dispute’ was thus given a wide meaning so as to cover even such cases in which there was no rival claimant. Reference may at this stage be made to the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in C.B. Gautam vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra). The constitutional validity of Chapter XX-C of the IT Act, 1961 was assailed in the said case. One of the contentions urged before their Lordships was that the legislation envisaged vesting of the property in the Central Government free of all encumbrances. This provision it was argued would work unfairly and unreasonably against those who held encumbrances over the property in the form of leases or mortgages. The rights of such encumbrance-holders being valuable rights could not be terminated, significantly diminished or destroyed without payment of any compensation for the same. The Court found merit in that contention and declared that the expression ‘free of all encumbrances’ was arbitrary without any rational nexus with the object of the legislation in question and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Sec. 269UE was to that extent held to be unconstitutional. More importantly, the Supreme Court held that where the relevant agreement to sell the property envisages a sale free of all encumbrances or certain encumbrances, it would vest in the Central Government free of such encumbrances. In other words, the Central Government would acquire title to the property in the same fashion as the prospective purchaser would have done if the sale transaction pursuant to the agreement to sell had resulted in a proper transfer. The following passage is in this regard relevant : “In the result the expression “free from all encumbrances” in sub-s. (1) of s. 269UE is struck down and sub-s. (1) of s. 269UE must be read without the expression “free from all encumbrances” with the result that the property in question would vest in the Central Government subject to such encumbrances and leasehold interests as are subsisting thereon except for such of them as are agreed to be discharged by the vendor before the sale is completed. If under the relevant agreement to sell the property is agreed to be sold free of all encumbrances or certain encumbrances, it would vest in the Central Government free of such encumbrances. Similarly, subs. (2) of s. 269UE will be read down so that if the holder of an encumbrance or a lessee is in possession of the property and under the agreement to sell the property, it is not provided that the sale would be free of such encumbrances or leasehold interests, the encumbrance-holder or the lessee who is in possession will not be obliged to deliver possession of the property to the Appropriate Authority or any person authorised by it and the provisions of sub-s. (3) also would not apply to such persons. If the provisions of s. 269UE are read down in the manner indicated above, then, in our opinion, the provisions of sub-s. (6) of that section do not present any difficulty because the vesting in the Central Government would be subject to such encumbrances and leasehold rights as stated earlier.”
The Court then proceeded to deal specifically with encumbrances in the form of tenancies whether monthly or long-term. In so far as monthly tenancies were concerned, their Lordships dealt with a situation where the agreement to sell does not provide for vacant possession or the determination of monthly tenancy and declared that in any such cases, the tenancies would continue even after pre-emptive order of purchase is made in favour of the Central Government. The Court however clarified that in cases of monthly tenants continued after making of such orders of purchase, the tenants under the Central Government would lose protection of the relevant rent laws not because the IT Act provides for the same but because the relevant rent control legislations do not apply to the properties owned by the Central Government.
7. We are not in the instant case, dealing with a situation where the encumbrance in the form of a tenancy qua the property in question has to pass on to the Central Government. We are on the contrary dealing with a case where the property purchased by the Central Government has to pass on to it free from any encumbrances. That is because the appellant-purchaser had in the agreement executed between him and the owner of the property contracted to purchase the property free from any such encumbrances. The specific situation covered by the Supreme Court decision in C.B. Gautam’s case and referred to above is not, therefore, directly applicable in the instant case. That does not however mean that the ratio in C.B. Gautam’s case has no application for the later part of the judgment is clear enough to take care of cases like the one in hand. Their Lordships have, while dealing with the cases in which sales have to be effected free of all encumbrances or leasehold rights, held that in such cases the Central Government shall acquire the property free of such encumbrances or lease. In such cases, the holders of the encumbrances or leasehold interests would have to obtain their compensation from the amount awarded as the purchase price to the owner of the property. This is evident from the following passage : “As we have stated earlier, where an agreement for sale provides that the property is intended to be sold free of all encumbrances or leasehold rights, the order for purchase of such property under s. 269UD(1) in the said Chapter would result in the said property vesting in the Central Government free of such encumbrances or leasehold interests. In such a case, the holders of the encumbrances or leasehold interests would have to obtain their compensation from the amount awarded as the purchase price to the owner of the property. This appears to be a fair construction because, in such a case, the apparent consideration can be expected to include the value of such leasehold interests or encumbrances. The holders of the encumbrances or leasehold interests which would be destroyed in this manner can be said to be persons interested as contemplated in cl. (e) of s. 269UA. In this connection, we may refer to sub-s. (5) of s. 269UE which declares that nothing in the said section which deals with the vesting of property in the Central Government shall operate to discharge the transferor or any other person (not being the Central Government) from liability in respect of any encumbrances on the property and, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, such liability may be enforced against the transferor or such other person. This provision makes it amply clear that in the case we have just referred to, the encumbrance- holder or the holder of the leasehold rights could claim the fair value of his encumbrance or the leasehold interest out of the amount paid on account of the purchase price to the owner of the immovable property acquired by the Central Government under s. 269UD.” [Emphasis, italicized in print, supplied]
8. Reverting back to the facts of the instant case, the tenancy over the property in the present case was an encumbrance which was not supposed to pass on to the Central Government in the light of the stipulation contained in the agreement which was to the following effect : “2. That the vendor assures the purchaser that the Schedule property is free from all encumbrances, Court attachments, minor litigations, etc., over the schedule property and shall hand over vacant possession of the schedule property at the time of registration of the sale deed.” [Emphasis, italicized in print, supplied] The property was to pass on to the Central Government just as it was to pass on to the appellant-purchaser free from any such encumbrances including the encumbrance of a monthly tenancy which Mr. Sheshadri enjoyed over the same. The Supreme Court has in the passage extracted above clearly recognised the right of the encumbrance-holder to claim compensation from the owner from out of the amount awarded as purchase price in favour of the latter. In other words, the amount of apparent consideration payable to the owner was supposed to represent the value of the property inclusive of all encumbrances including the encumbrance vis-a-vis the appellant to the extent he had paid the advance sale price to the owner and the compensation which Mr. Sheshadri could claim on account of his being a tenant in the property. It is true as between the appellant and the owner, there was no dispute at any stage regarding the latter’s right to recover Rs. 3 lakhs paid pursuant to the agreement to sell. But, that is not true insofar as Mr. Sheshadri is concerned. Mr. Sheshadri had, as observed earlier, insisted that he would like to continue the tenancy over the property under the Central Government. That may not have been legally permissible having regard to the stipulations in the agreement and the right of the Central Government to acquire the property free from any encumbrances, but Mr. Sheshadri, as a tenant certainly had the right to demand a share out of the apparent sale consideration payable to the owner. That a dispute regarding the entitlement of Mr. Sheshadri to share the apparent consideration with the owner had arisen on account of the objections filed by him is evident from a plain reading of the said objections. It was evident from the stance adopted by Mr. Sheshadri that he either wished to continue in occupation of the property or would expect to be suitably compensated for the surrender or termination of his tenancy rights over the same. Viewed in this background, the Central Government was in our opinion perfectly justified in perceiving that there was a bona fide dispute regarding the entitlement of the owner to receive the entire amount of the apparent consideration payable to him. The existence of such a dispute and the time-frame within which the deposit had to be made would leave no option for the Central Government except to deposit the amount in discharge of its obligation under s. 269UG. There was in the circumstances no failure of any essential requirement prescribed by law in the instant case so as to result in an abrogation of the purchase in terms of s. 269UH of the IT Act.
9. There is considerable merit even in the alternative submission made by Mr. Seshachala. The property in question has since been put to public auction and has been sold in favour of the respondent No. 4 for valuable consideration. The sale has, as noticed earlier, taken place nearly eight years ago. In C.B. Gautam’s case and so also in Shatabadi’s case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court had declined to interfere with the transactions that had already been finalised whether pursuant to public auctions or otherwise. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court relied upon by Mr. Seshachala. Even otherwise, the writ jurisdiction of this Court has to be exercised having due regard to the subsequent developments that may have materially changed the circumstances of a given case. It is fairly well settled that just because there is an irregularity or even an illegality in the passing of an order does not necessarily mean that a writ Court must intervene to set right the error. Whether or not the Court should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case having regard to the equities that have intervened between the date of filing of the petition and the pronouncement of the final judgment in the same.
1. The appellant in the instant case has received the amount paid by him as early as in the year 1993 from the seller. The error pointed out by the appellant for reversal of the entire process is at the most an error in the nature of procedure rather than substance. The requirement of paying or depositing the apparent sale consideration within the stipulated period has been substantially complied with. The amount deposited is accurate and the deposit is made within the period stipulated for the purpose. The cases relied upon by the appellant in which the deposits were not made in full or the same were made beyond the period prescribed are, therefore, clearly distinguishable. The argument that, instead of tendering the amount, when the Central Government deposited the same, it thereby committed an illegality is an argument only in despair. Having regard to the fact that the amount of apparent consideration was subject to a charge not only from the appellant on account of the amount paid by him under the agreement but also subject to the right of Mr. Sheshadri to claim compensation for termination of his tenancy rights, the making of the deposit before the Appropriate Authority was the only just option in the circumstances. Inasmuch as the Central Government decided to choose that option, it did
not commit any illegality nor was there any failure of justice. There is, therefore, no room for interference with the impugned orders even on that ground.
2. In the result, this writ appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in thecircumstances without any orders as to costs.
[Citation : 270 ITR 27]
