Calcutta H.C : The petitioner herein challenged the valuation made by the Appropriate Authority of the IT Department, Calcutta, dt. 22nd Sept., 1997, under s. 269UD(1)

High Court Of Calcutta

Manak Chand Rampuria vs. Union Of India & Ors.

Section 269UD

Amitava Lala, J.

Writ Petn. No. 2163 of 1997

4th October, 2001

Counsel Appeared

A.K. Roy Chowdhury & Ms. Sutapa Roy Chowdhury, for the Petitioner : M.P. Agarwal, S.N. Dutta & Md. Nizamuddin, for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 : R.N. Bajoria, J.P. Khaitan & Ms. Monika Ghosh, for the Respondent Nos. 7 & 8



By making this writ petition, the petitioner herein challenged the valuation made by the Appropriate Authority of the IT Department, Calcutta, dt. 22nd Sept., 1997, under s. 269UD(1) of the IT Act, 1961, in respect of the immovable property being space measuring 2,688 square feet of super built-up area on the east-south side of the second floor being flat No. 2A with one car parking space in the basement with variable proportionate share of land of the building situated at premises No. 4, Meredith Street, Calcutta, and butted and bounded as follows : North : By premises No. 6, Sooterkin Street, South : By the Meredith Street, East : By 3, Meredith Street, and West : By No. 5, Meredith Street known as Piroja India.

2. According to the petitioner, two previous valuations were made by the valuers of the authority concerned and those were so inconsistent and incomparable, a third valuation was directed to be made by a valuer of the concerned authority. Such valuation is under challenge before the writ Court. Under normal circumstances, a valuation by an authority should not be interfered with by the writ Court having no fact-finding machinery to overcome the situation. But when the finding is perverse or capricious or bad from the face of it, the writ Court cannot ignore the same specially when there is no alternative remedy of appeal as against the said valuation. This is such a situation. The first valuation dt. 28th May, 1997, made by the appropriate valuer, IT Department, Calcutta, EAC (effective apparent consideration) of Rs. 38.45 lakhs is 11.81 per cent, below the FMV (fair market value) if EAC is taken as base. The second valuation dt. 18th July, 1997, the authority came to a conclusion that EAC (effective apparent consideration) of Rs. 38.45 lakhs is 62.47 per cent, below the FMV if EAC is taken as base. As per the third valuation EAC of Rs. 38.45 lakhs is 40 per cent, below the FMV (fair market value) if EAC is considered as base. The first valuation was made by an executive engineer of the IT Department. The second valuation was made by a Superintending Engineer (A.A.), IT Department and the third valuation was made by the Chief Engineer and two other CIT members being the appropriate authorities of the IT Department. All the valuations were made within the time frame as given under the law. In the premises, one aspect is very clear that the first valuation of 11.81 per cent, was not appropriate from the face of it. It appears to this Court that the transferees/respondents Nos. 7 and 8 are much more vocal before this Court than the writ petitioner/transferor who has only adopted the argument advanced by the transferees. The contractor is made party to the writ petition but no one appeared for him.

The main criticism of Mr. R.N. Bajoria, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the transferees, is that the entire valuation is totally wrongful and baseless. The authority proceeded on the basis of valuation of the year 1995 of a commercial building known as Magnet House standing on one of the important streets of the city of Calcutta, viz., 6, Chittaranjan Avenue. Apparently, such valuation cannot be made in respect of the residential flat situated in a lane by the side of such commercial house. Commercial houses situate in different commercial places of the city can be comparable on the basis of commercial viability. Similarly, residential houses, or flats can be comparable in between the different residential places of the city. Therefore, the very basis and foundation of the valuation of a residential flat situate in a lane of a high-rise commercial house of the locality cannot be comparable. Mr. Bajoria has given an example in respect of the cities abroad by saying that there are downtown systems in respect of valuation. The valuation of the residential houses in the residential areas are much above these commercial areas. For an example, he said that in the evening there cannot be any life of the people of the private residential houses in the commercial areas because the human movement is restricted only at the office hours. I cannot avoid but to accept such classic example as put forward by Mr. Bajoria in respect of the comparable valuation in between the commercial houses of a locality with residential houses/flats of the same locality. It appears even from the third and impugned valuation as made I find that the same is based on valuation between the commercial and residential houses of the same locality. Therefore, even the third valuation cannot be construed as free from ambiguity.

It appears from the reasoning as given by the appropriate authorities under the impugned order of valuation that the superintending engineer being the appropriate authority has not relied upon the report of the executive engineer who is a lower authority and the same was found not proper. The superintending engineer has relied on a sale instance of a property which is adjacent to the impugned property and due assessments have been made in respect of location, surroundings, time gap, type of building, etc. Regarding the point raised by the sale instance, the property was commercial in nature whereas the impugned property is residential, the superintendingengineer’s opinion is that the impugned property is considerably potential for commercial use as the building is situated in a commercial area. The authorities under the impugned order of valuation agreed with the opinion and the valuation done by the superintending engineer as fair. The transferees have also filed a valuation report dt. 16th Sept., 1997. From such valuation it appears that the fair market value of the property is Rs. 31.31 lakhs. The authorities, while working out the valuation again committed a mistake by giving only five per cent, difference in between the commercial building in respect of the ratio of commercial versus residential of the locality and size of the deal in between two properties being 6,284 square feet and 2,372 square feet which appears, according to the Court, bad from the face of it. That apart, the valuation has not been kept restricted to that score alone but also made on the basis of surmise and conjecture when neither the transferor nor the contractor attended the meeting held by them. In any event, the transferees who are very much vocal before this Court were all along present and made their submissions in all respects. Both the transferor and transferee have categorically said that there is a clear case of violation of principles of natural justice while making the valuation. One of such is the refusal to give any records of the valuation of the Magnet House at 6, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, under Case No.A.A./Calcutta/1205/Feb. of 1995. According to Mr. Bajoria such documents are vital for coming to the appropriate conclusion.

Apart from that, a question has come in the mind of the Court whether writ jurisdiction can be invoked in such a situation irrespective of the question of natural justice and if the writ Court can come to the conclusion that the valuation so made is not proper, whether the matter can be sent to the authorities for the purpose of a fresh valuation or not. So far as the second part is concerned Mr. Bajoria raised his objection by saying that since the statutory period of valuation has already expired there is no scope left for the authorities to make a fresh valuation and secondly even if such valuation is made, escalation of the price cannot be taken into consideration for such valuation. It is important to mention hereunder that it is not a case where valuations are not made within time and the writ Court can interfere and restrain the authorities from making any valuation out of time due to statutory restrictions. This is a case where all the valuation is made within time. This is the main objection about interference of the writ Court raised by Mr. M.P. Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the authorities being respondents Nos. 1 to 6. Therefore, now it is important to come to an appropriate conclusion in respect of the aforesaid point and objection in connection thereto.

7. Chapter XXC of the IT Act is governing the field of purchase of the immovable properties by the Central Government in certain cases of transfer. Out of such Chapter, ss. 269UC, 269UD, 269UE and 269UL are the relevant sections for coming to an appropriate conclusion. Sec. 269UC is dealing with the restrictions on transfer of immovable property whereas under s. 269UD the appropriate authorities are entitled to order for purchase of immovable property by the Central Government. Sec. 269UE is dealing with vesting of property. Sec. 269UL is dealing with restrictions on registration, etc., of the documents in respect of transfer of immovable property. Therefore, in the instant case the relevant provision is s. 269UD(1) whereunder the appropriate authority after the receipt of the statement under sub-s. (3) of s. 269UC in respect of the immovable property or any instrument or any agreement for the time being in force make an order for the purchase of such immovable property by the Central Government at an amount equal to the amount available in the apparent situation. A proviso has been introduced thereunder that no such order shall be made in respect of immovable property after the expiration of a period of two months from the end of the month in which the statement referred to in s. 269UC in respect of such property is received by the appropriate authority. Such period of two months has been extended by a further proviso as introduced on 1st June, 1993, by incorporating that the period of such date will be construed as three months in the place and instead of two months period as given above. In 1995, a further proviso has been introduced by saying that if there is any defect, then the time will be calculated from the date of the receipt of the rectified statement by the appropriate authority. In any event, in view of further introduction of limitation by an amendment of the Finance Act, 1993, w.e.f. 1st June, 1993, the period of limitation under the section and the second proviso shall be reckoned, where any stay has been granted by any Court against the passing of the order for the purchase of the immovable property under this Chapter, with reference to the date of vacation of the stay.

The other important part which has been inserted therein by the amendment w.e.f. 17th Nov., 1992, is that before making any order under sub-s. (1) as aforesaid, the appropriate authority shall give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the transferor in occupation of the immovable property and if the transferor is not in occupation of the property the transferee and every other person whom the appropriate authority knows to be interested for the property. Therefore, in all, three months period will be counted from the receipt of the appropriate application unless there is an order of stay by the Court and if the order of stay is vacated it will continue with reference from the date of the vacation of such stay and parties as aforesaid will be given reasonable opportunity of hearing. This being the position, so far as the reasonable opportunity is concerned it appears to this Court that on 11th Sept., 1997, several points were agitated on behalf of the transferor/transferees and contractor. In the course ofdiscussion the contractor stated that he started construction of the entire building around 1990 with the transferor herein and an unsigned copy of a letter dt. 17th Sept., 1997, was filed to testify the fact. The fact of construction having been started in the year 1990 is further corroborated by the valuation report as filed by the transferees. The representative of the contractor agreed before the appropriate authority that the copy of the relevant agreement will be filed on 18th Sept., 1997. But neither he appeared nor filed any letter seeking adjournment. Therefore, there is no fault on the part of the transferees who have appeared before the authority and made their submissions. But the authorities considered the absence of the transferor and contractor as hiding of material documents for the facts but I do not understand how the transferees will be made victim of the circumstances when they were present and produced the records relevant for the purpose. For an example, even before this Court I feel that thetransferees being respondents Nos. 7 and 8 are much more aggrieved and vocal than the petitioner and lead the process of adjudication to come to a definite conclusion in their favour, I cannot avoid the situation because of the reason that either of the parties can be the victim of the circumstances.

It might have been the reason on the part of the transferor that there cannot be a monetary loss if the order goes either way. But it will be definitely a monetary loss so far as the transferees are concerned who were present before the adjudicating authority and raised a valuable question of determination of value and effectively participated before this Court in raising a substantial question of law as regards the limitation in connection with the valuation afresh for escalation of price. Therefore, in coming back to an appropriate conclusion I have no hesitation in my mind that if this Court ignores such part by holding that reasonable opportunity was given and that too in the presence of the transferees, it will be an injustice towards such parties specially the transferees so far the case is concerned.

8. Mr. Bajoria wanted to strengthen his case by showing a reported judgment, in Vysya Bank Ltd. vs. Appropriate Authority (1999) 151 CTR (Cal) 239 : (1998) 233 ITR 560 (Cal) : TC S3.280 for its persuasive value. It appears to me that such Court similarly held that it is not for the writ Court to reassess or reappraise the evidence on the basis of which the appropriate authority has passed the order and not to sit as a Court of appeal over the aforesaid order of the appropriate authority. But at the same time it is well settled that if such an order passed by the appropriate authority is perverse in that it does not take into consideration relevant materials or takes into consideration extraneous matters or is based on misconstruction of the materials and documents or records the writ Court certainly can interfere with such an order. There it was further held that in case where the Court set aside the impugned order passed by the appropriate authority on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice or for any other infirmities the matter should be sent back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration of the matter in accordance with law or not. The Court ultimately held in view of the earlier judgment of this Court as well as the judgments of the Division Benches of the Madras and Delhi High Courts that the question of remitting the matter back to the appropriate authority for giving them an opportunity to proceed in accordance with law afresh cannot arise as after the expiry of the period of three months the appropriate authority has no further jurisdiction to exercise such power of preemptive purchase.

9. He has also relied upon Appropriate Authority vs. Vysya Bank Ltd. (2000) 161 CTR (Cal) 293 : (2000) 244 ITR 318 (Cal) a Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court which affirmed the aforesaid single Bench judgment of this Court. There it was held that in view of the finding of the single Judge that no opportunity had been given to the vendor and vendee to be heard prior to the pre-emptive purchase of the property as required under s. 269UD there was no merit in the appeal. As per the agreement of sale major amounts were due to the vendor from the vendee for a number of years and since they could not be paid to the vendor on account of the proceedings under s. 269UD, the vendor was entitled to interest at the rate of 12 per cent, from the Government for the period for which the amounts could not be paid. However, it appears from the recording of the judgment that none appeared on behalf of the appropriate authority being the appellant therein. Even thereafter, the order was passed considering the merits of the issue.

10. Mr. Bajoria also cited a judgment DLF Universal Ltd. vs. Appropriate Authority (2000) 160 CTR (SC) 401 : (2000) 243 ITR 730 (SC) from which it appears that under s. 269UD an order by the appropriate authority has to be made within three months of the receipt by it of the statement in Form No. 37-I. The statement as filed was in order. Since the appropriate authority did not pass any order within the prescribed period, it had to issue the no objection certificate under s. 269UL. It was of no use at the distant time in sending the matter back to the appropriate authority for again applying its mind as the period prescribed within which it had to pass the order for purchasing the property by the Central Government had long since expired. Therefore, in effect, the Supreme Court refused to grant any time for second show cause in view of the circumstances as above.

11. All the aforesaid cases are based on a well celebrated judgment of the Supreme Court in C.B. Gautam vs. Union of India (1992) 108 CTR (SC) 304 r/w (1993) 110 CTR (SC) 179 : (1993) 199 ITR 530 (SC) : TC S3.142. There it was held that in order to avoid the situation and yet to ensure that no injustice is caused to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of this case, that statement in Form No. 37-I submitted by the petitioner as set out earlier shall be treated as if it was submitted on the date of signing of the judgment. Thereafter, if the appropriate authority considered it fit, it may issue a show-cause notice calling upon the petitioner and other concerned parties to show cause why an order for compulsory purchase of the property in question should not be made under the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 269UD and also give a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner and such other concerned parties to show cause against such an order being made. In view of the limited time frame this will have to be done with a sense of urgency. A question arose at the time of or after delivering the judgment about what will happen in respect of various pending cases either before the Supreme Court, High Courts and before the authorities. It was clarified in the judgment that the period of two months about the limited retrospectivity imported to the judgment for a period of two months referred to in s. 269UD(1) shall be reckoned with reference to the date of disposal of each of such pending matters either before the Supreme Court or before the High Courts as the case may be. Where stay orders are vacated the period shall be reckoned with reference to the date of such vacating of stay orders. But in all the cases which are pending before the authorities and which though not agitated before the Courts of law are pending at various stages before the authorities Form No. 37-I shall be deemed to have been filed as on the date of the judgment of this Court dt. 17th Nov., 1992, for the purpose of completion of the proceedings in terms of s. 269UD(1). According to Mr. Bajoria, the ratio of the judgments for calculating the date under s. 269UD(1) of the Act was restricted in respect of the clarifications given thereunder. It cannot be applicable principally for an indefinite period. Therefore, in the present case, the Court has no other alternative but either to accept the valuation or to reject the valuation. If the rejection order is made, there is no scope for second show cause in view of the statutory restrictions of three months’ period (w. e. f. 1st June, 1993) being the substituted period under the second proviso to s. 269UD(1) of the IT Act, 1961. According to him, as per the provisions of s. 269UD of the Act the appropriate authority has two options either to purchase the property or to give a certificate of no objection to its transfer specially when the appropriate authority does not have the power to determine the legality of the proposed transfer. In support of this decision in Murlidhar Ratanlal Exports Ltd. vs. Appropriate Authority (2000) 160 CTR (Cal) 420 : (2000) 243 ITR 752 (Cal) appex. it appears from the judgment that the appropriate authority has not passed any order within the time limit on the basis of Form No. 37-I.

14. He further cited two judgments reported in Smt. K. Durga Rani vs. Appropriate Authority (1999) 151 CTR (AP) 343 : (1998) 231 ITR 472 (AP) : TC S3.278 and CIT vs. Mrs. Rita Joseph (1999) 153 CTR (Mad) 475 : (1999) 238 ITR 391 (Mad). In both the matters the question of taking into consideration certain materials in ascertaining the fair market value arose. According to the Andhra Pradesh High Court Division Bench, the writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 can be invoked in such circumstances if the decision arrived at by the appropriate authority is unreasonable on the basis of irrelevant consideration taken into such decision. But the competent authority choosing the level as the market value cannot be accepted as market value is much less than the fair market value. The judicial notice can be taken of the fact that in a large urban property values differ sometimes very radically from one area to another and sometimes the difference could be very substantial even when the physical distance is not great. A residential area situated away from the main thoroughfare cannot be regarded as consuming the same price as a building situated on the main road in a commercial locality. The mere fact that the road is within the radius of five kilo meters does not make it ipso facto comparable to this property. Mr. M.P. Agarwal, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the authority, has made very limited but specific submissions. According to him, if the authority chooses not to complete the course of action within the time limit under s. 269UD obviously the writ jurisdiction can be invoked challenging the same because there is a statutory restriction in respect of the time period. But when the authority made the valuations within the specified time period either the writ petition will be dismissed as not being perverse or send back the matter to the appropriate authority for making a time-bound programme.

He has cited a single Bench judgment of this Court because of its persuasive value as reported in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs. Appropriate Authority (1995) 126 CTR (Cal) 161 : (1995) 213 ITR 288 (Cal) : TC S3.160 to establish that when each of the points raised by the appropriate authority had been considered and the sale of the property in a locality relied upon by the authority cannot be determined by the High Court. The notices herein are given that the writ petition ought to be dismissed. However, I find that the main reason for refusing the order to the petitioner was the delay in moving the writ petition. According to the Court, in view of C. B.Gautam’s case (supra), the time frame under Chapter XX-C of the Act is a trite one. He has further relied upon a judgment Appropriate Authority vs. Mass Traders (P) Ltd. (1993) 111 CTR (Kar) 294 : (1993) 202 ITR 741 (Kar) : TC S3.172 which is a special Bench judgment. It appears that in writ jurisdiction if an error of law apparent from the record is disclosed and the writ is issued the usual course to adopt is to correct the error instead of sending the case back to the special Tribunal for its decision in accordance with law. It would be inappropriate for the High Court in exercising its writ jurisdiction to consider the evidence for itself and to reach its own conclusion in matters which have been left by the legislature to the decisions of the specially constituted Tribunal. He has ultimately relied upon a Supreme Court judgment in Appropriate Authority vs. Smt. Sudha Patil (1998) 150 CTR (SC) 405 : (1999) 235 ITR 118 (SC) : TC S3. 298 to establish that merely because no appeal is provided for or against the order of the appropriate authority directing compulsory acquisition by the Government, the supervisory power of the High Court does not get enlarged nor can the High Court exercise an appellate power. If, from the materials, two views are possible one which has been given by the inferior Tribunal and the other when the High Court may, on examining the materials itself, come to a conclusion, even then it would not be possible for the High Court to substitute its conclusion for that of the Tribunal. Mr. Agarwal distinguished the judgment cited by learned counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 7 and 8 in various ways inclusive of the point as above regarding the application of mind by the appropriate authority beyond the time period. As regards C.B. Gautam’s case (supra) he contended that in view of the fact that the object of the provisions of Chapter XX-C is a laudable object, viz., to counter evasion of tax in transactions of sale of immovable property, the Supreme Court considered it necessary to limit the retrospective operation of the judgment in such a manner as not to defeat the acquisition altogether. If the original time-frame prescribed in Chapter XX-C is rigidly applied it would not be possible for the appropriate authority concerned to pass an order under s. 269UD(1) at all in respect of the property in question. To avoid such a situation, the Supreme Court was pleased to frame the time.

According to me, the fact situation of the instant case is unique. Hence, the petitionertransferor appears to be not much aggrieved in attending the proceeding on the date fixed by the appropriate authority. As a result whereof respondents Nos. 7 and 8 are made victims of circumstances. Hence, if I pass any order in respect of such petitioner to transfer it will become abuse of the process of Court of law. On the other hand, if I disallow I shall cause great injustice to respondents Nos. 7 and 8/transferees who are very much particular in attending and also vocal in respect of their case before the High Court authority. Hence, a conclusion can be drawn that the appropriate authority passed an order making respondents Nos. 7 and 8/transferees victims of circumstances. Finally, in view of non-appearance of the petitioner is reflected from the order impugned. Had it been the position that it is a writ petition of respondents Nos. 7 and 8/transferees it would have been a different scenario altogether. I have no hesitation in my mind to say that it would have been much more favourable scenario so far as the writ jurisdiction is concerned. Not being so, I cannot agree with Mr. Bajoria who is saying that only two courses are open—either to accept or reject the valuation by the writ Court. According to me, the third aspect of sending the matter back to the authority for following the principles laid down by C.B. Gautam’s case (supra) cannot be ruled out in the fact situation. We should not be forgetful that the order and execution in respect of the pending matters, either before the Supreme Court, the High Courts or before the authorities, have been guided by the judgment of the Supreme Court in C.B. Gautam’s case (supra) but the principle of drawing the third line is still valid and operative in a fact situation. It is true that there is no provision of appeal under the IT Act in respect of valuation. But in view of Appropriate Authority vs. Smt. Sudha Patil (supra) merely because no appeal is provided for, against the order of the appropriate authority directing compulsory acquisition by the Government, the supervisory power of the High Court does not get enlarged nor can the High Court exercise the appellate power. It is categorically held therein that on the materials if two views are possible—one which has been given the High Court may, on examining the materials, come to a conclusion, even then it would not be possible for the High Court to substitute its conclusion for that of the authority. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case where two valuations which are so different and militating with each other and the authority ultimately finds in between the aforesaid two valuations made within the time frame, mechanism available for the writ Court to ascertain the position is totally unwarranted.

It is to be remembered and very correctly pointed out by Mr. Agarwal that the question of a second show cause in respect of issuance of no objection certificate for pre-emptive purchase was ruled out in the judgment of the Supreme Court in DLF Universal Ltd. vs. Appropriate Authority (supra) on the ground that the statutory timeperiod as given under s. 269UD had expired at the instance of the appropriate authority. Therefore, such ratio of the Supreme Court along with other judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts on the same line cannot be applicable in the present case. Hence, I have to confine myself in respect of argumentative value of the judgments in which the Court held that in spite of considering the evidentiary value by the appropriate authority within time for not having appeal forum, the writ jurisdiction can be invoked to reappraise the facts and in such a case the order affirmatively can be passed in favour of the petitioner/transferor, specially respondents Nos. 7 and

8/ transferees.

19. In Vysya Bank Ltd. vs. Appropriate Authority of IT (supra) it was held that if the order passed by the appropriate authority is perverse the writ Court certainly can interfere with such order specially on the fact that the nature of the enquiry under the provisions of the Act may be a summary one that can hardly dispense with the basic requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the pre-emptive order forcompulsory purchase. I have no doubt in my mind that the same is the basic requirement of law specially in a case where there is no appeal forum but the question is that upon visualising the perversity the writ Court will strike down the valuation of property and will send the matter back to the authority concerned because of the fact that on such scope the Supreme Court in Appropriate Authority vs. Smt. Sudha Patil (supra) clearly held, taking contrary view, that if the High Court, on examining materials comes to a conclusion even then it would not be possible for the High Court to substitute its conclusion for that of the authority. It appears to this Court that a Division Bench in Appropriate Authority of IT vs. Vysya Bank Ltd. (supra) affirmed the decision of the single Bench where the aforesaid Supreme Court case was also referred to. But the interesting part is that nobody appeared on behalf of the IT authority being the appellant therein and the judgment of the Division Bench of the Court was rested in deciding the issue in merit in the absence of the authority. Although, the Supreme Court judgment as in Appropriate Authority vs. Smt. Sudha Patil (supra) was taken note of but there is no ratio forthcoming from the decision of the judgment of the Division Bench about such reference. The reference, if any, is made that is only in respect of the claim of the interest required to be paid for the period or not. Thus, taking into account the balancing factors available in the fact situation I have to accept C.B. Gautam’s case (supra) on principle. Therefore, I have no embargo in directing the authority to take third line, i.e., fresh valuation within a period prescribed under the order of this Court. Therefore, all the earlier valuations stand set aside. Thus, the writ petition stands disposed of with a direction upon the authority concerned to make valuation afresh taking into account the then value of comparable residential accommodation within a period of one month from the date of communication of this order in the light of the judgment and order passed by this Court. However, no order is passed as to costs.

[Citation : 256 ITR 305]

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