High Court Of Bombay
State Of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Champalal Bajaj & Anr.
Sections 132(3), 275A, 279
A.A. Desai & B.U. Wahane, JJ.
Criminal Appeal No. 195 of 1987
3rd August, 1990
A. DESAI, J.:
By this appeal at the instance of the State and revision application on behalf of the CIT, the appellant and revisionist have questioned the validity and correctness of the finding of acquittal for the offence punishable under s. 275A of the IT Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) r/w s. 406 and s. 461 of the IPC, 1860.
2. Pursuant to an authorisation under sub-s. (1) of s. 132 of the Act, P. W.-3, Prasad, on 29th Oct., 1985, undertook search of the premises of respondent-accused Narayan Bajaj. The search continued till 9.30 p.m. However, it was incomplete. During the course, P. W.-3, Prasad, and the raiding party separated the pawned jewellery and kept it in the almirah. The almirah was sealed. P. W.-3, Prasad, then issued a prohibitory order purported to be under sub-s. (3) of s. 132 of the Act. Seizure panchanama (exhibit 21) was drawn.
3. P. W.-3, Prasad, and his party next day, i.e., on 30th Oct., 1985, resumed and continued their search. They opened the almirah and found that some articles were missing. On verification, they noticed that the steel plates on the rear side of the almirah have been cut at two places. P. W. 2, Krishnamachari, the local ITO, thereafter lodged a report, vide exhibit 16, to the Police Station, Yavatmal. P. W.-6, Tiwari seized the almirah in question, vide panchanama (exhibit 23). The almirah was then handed over to the accused on supratnama.
4. After completing the investigation, the accused was charged and tried for the offences enumerated hereinabove. The defence of the accused was one of denial. The trial Court observed that (a) prior sanction of the CIT as envisaged under s. 279 of the Act to prosecute the accused for the offence punishable under s. 275A of the Act was not obtained, (b) the authorised Officer, namely, P. W.-3, Prasad had not reached the conclusion that the pawned articles kept in the almirah were undisclosed property for the purpose of the Act. Moreover, it was not totally impracticable for the raiding party to continue and complete the search. As such, P. W.-3, Prasad could not resort to sub-s. (3) of s. 132 of the Act for issuing the prohibitory order, (c) the almirah in question and the supratnama were not produced in the Court for verification. Adopting these reasonings, the learned trial Court has recorded the impugned finding of acquittal. Heard Shri Charde, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, Shri Jaiswal, learned counsel for the applicant-revisionist and S/Shri Palshikar and Akolkar, learned counsel for the accused.
5. Contravention of the prohibitory order purported to be under sub-s. (3) of s. 132 is made punishable under s. 275A of the Act. Sec. 279 of the Act, as it then stood, provided that a person shall not be proceeded against for an offence under s. 275A…except at the instance of the Chief CIT or CIT. As per the mandate of the provisions, it follows that the IT Department cannot proceed or prosecute the offender who has committed a breach of the prohibitory order except at the instance or with the authority of the CIT of the Department. In the instant case, it is true that the report to the police station has been made by P. W.-2, Krishnamachari, vide exhibit 16. However, P. W.-2, Krishnamachari, the local ITO, in his report, after narrating the incident had merely prayed for registration and investigation of the offences. After completion of the investigation, the State has launched the prosecution. In the case before us, the prosecution of the accused-respondent is neither on the complaint nor by the complainant. The prosecution being at the instance and on behalf of the State, s. 279 of the Act has no application. The reasons as adopted by the learned trial Judge are patently erroneous.
6. Relying on the decisions reported in H. L. Sibal vs. CIT (1975) 101 ITR 112 (P&H), Om Parkash Jindal vs. Union of India (1976) 104 ITR 389 (P&H) and Jain & Jain vs. Union of India (1982) 134 ITR 655 (Bom), it is urged before us that besides the CIT, the authorised officer, before effecting seizure, has to reach the conclusion that the property in question was undisclosed for the purposes of the Act. It is submitted that P. W.-3, Prasad, the authorised officer, has not reached such conclusion or formulated the opinion that the pawned articles kept in the almirah in question were such property. Besides this, due to late hours, it cannot be said that, for the raiding party, it was not practicable to complete the search. In the absence of the requisite ingredients and conditions, it is urged that sub-s. (3) of s. 132 of the Act could not be resorted to for issuing the prohibitory order. Consequently, the order (exhibit 18) prohibiting the accused was without any legal foundation and void ab initio. Breach or violation of such order, in the submission of learned counsel for the accused, does not constitute any offence punishable under s. 275A of the Act. Authorisation under sub-s. (1) of s. 132 of the Act empowers the concerned officer firstly to make an entry into the premises of a particular person, then to search and hold enquiry, thereafter to seize and lastly to prepare an inventory of such articles, valuables or jewellery. This is a single, continuous and homogenous process with various stages as described. Search, enquiry and formulating opinion are the stages prior to effecting seizure. There could not be a valid seizure unless the earlier stages are complete. Incompletion of search creates impediment in formulating the opinion and causing ultimate seizure of the concerned property.
P. W.-3, Prasad, has specifically stated that they reached Yavatmal at about 8.30 a.m. and then started their operation. It continued upto 9.30 p.m. According to the witnesses, it was not possible to complete the search on that day. Shri Palshikar, learned counsel appearing for the accused made a submission that this could not be a ground within the import of the term “reason” as envisaged in sub-s. (3) of s. 132 of the Act. According to learned counsel, may be due to late hours, it might be inconvenient for the concerned officers to complete the search, still it was not difficult, nor impossible.
The proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 132 of the Act deals with various contingencies when it becomes impracticable to seize the particular property or articles. The first proviso refers to building, place, vessel, vehicle, aircraft, etc., whereas the second proviso to sub-s. (1) refers to the impossibility or impracticability of taking physical possession of any valuable article. Sub-s. (3) of s. 132 of the Act with which we are concerned deals with the contingencies which are not covered by the second proviso to sub-s. (1). Sec. 132 (3) of the Act lays down that “the authorised Officer may, where it is not practicable to seize any such books of account, other documents, money, etc… for reasons other than those mentioned in the second proviso to sub-s. (1), serve an order on the owner…” In view of this legal provision, it is explicit that the contingency contemplated by sub-s. (3) of s. 132 of the Act could be other than those provided in the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 132 of the Act. Such contingency in the given case could be impracticability due to physical or mental incapability of the concerned Officer owing to over-strain. In view of our discussion, we hold that the reasons as contemplated under sub-s. (3) of s. 132 of the Act pertain to impracticability rather than impossibility. P. W.-2, Krishnamachari and P. W.-3, Prasad, have specifically stated that it was not feasible for them to complete the search even after continuing it for the whole night. As the completion of the search was not feasible, it had certainly created an impediment in the way of the Officer formulating the opinion and effecting seizure of the objectionable materials; as such, in view of our finding that it being a continuous and homogeneous process, incompletion of the search has certainly affected the ultimate act of effecting seizure of the property undisclosed for the purpose of the IT Act. In the situation, P. W.-3, Prasad, was competent to resort to sub-s. (3) of s. 132 of the Act for issuing the prohibitory order marked as exhibit 16. The order has a legal foundation and is within the parameters of the relevant provision. The same was, therefore, binding on the accused.
Now coming to the merits of the prosecution case, we find the testimony of P. W.-2, Krishnamachari, P. W.-3, Prasad and P. W.-6, P. S. I. Tiwari, coupled with exhibit 16 complaint, exhibit 21 search panchamana and exhibit B-5 seizure panchanama, P. W.-3, Prasad in examination-in-chief has deposed that “the bundles of the pawned articles along with some cash that was found were then kept in that almirah which became full. Before actually keeping ornaments in that almirah, I and Mani checked and verified that that almirah was quite safe and intact on all the sides.” The evidence of P. W.-2, Krishnamachari on this aspect is on similar lines and corroborating P. W.-
3. The defence has not questioned this statement of the witnesses nor has it suggested that the almirah in question was already having cut marks even at the time of handing over the same to the Officer on 29th Oct., 1985. Shri Palshikar, learned counsel for the accused, tried to urge before us that there is no reference in this behalf in the search panchanama (exhibit 21). It is true that in the search panchanama (exhibit 21) there is no such reference that the almirah was intact. However, considering the substantive testimony of the two witnesses which is consistent and cogent, omission in this regard in the panchanama (exhibit 21) does not bring any discredit to the version of these two witnesses. Besides this, the version of these witnesses that the articles kept to the full capacity of the almirah is further supported by complaint (exhibit 16).
12. As regards the incident on the next day, i.e., 30th Oct., 1985, P. W.-3, Prasad has stated that “I then opened the almirah. On opening the almirah, I thought (1) that the level of the bags in the almirah had gone down which was suggestive of the fact that some bags might have been removed, (2) I felt the smell of new paint, and (3) that there was a cut to the almirah in the rear side. That cut was about 5 and a half X 6 and half inches”. However, while cross-examining this witness in para (10) of exhibit 20, the omission in the police statement has been brought on record.
13. Another witness on this aspect is P. W.-2, Krishnamachari. He stated that “accordingly, I went there immediately by 11.15 a.m. I found that the almirah which was already opened by the search party was cut at two places at the back and the bags of ornaments were lesser in level than they were actually there”. While cross- examining this witness, the defence made a suggestion to which he has answered that, “it is true that, apart from the level (height) of the heaps of the cloth bags, there is no material to say that articles were removed from the second almirah by the accused. It is not true that the height (level) of cloth bags may automatically be lessened or reduced by lapse of time.” This positive suggestion on behalf of the defence is indicative of the aspect that they are not disputing the going down of the level of the bags as witnessed by the officers on 30th Oct., 1985.
14. P. W.-6, P. S. I. Tiwari, who seized the almirah, vide exhibit 23, has stated that he also noticed two cuts in the rear side and small particles of the steel plates inside the almirah. This version of the witness has also not been challenged. In the cross-examination, this witness has stated that, “I did not seize the very small tiny particles of the iron plate of the almirah as I did not think it necessary as their quantity was very small. These particles were visible to the eye. There were colour patches on the almirah back side but I did not take any photograph of those patches. I did not take any photograph of the two cuts that were made to the almirah back side. The sizes of the cuts as given in the panchanama are 3 inches by 6 and a half inches and 6 and a half inches by 5 and a half inches”. Considering the assertion of this witness read with that of others, the aspect of cutting the iron plate from the rear side at two places of almirah is established beyond doubt. This substantive testimony of the witnesses is further supported by complaint (exhibit 16) and seizure panchanama (exhibit 23) wherein the condition of the almirah has been elaborated in detail. As discussed, it is not the defence or clarification made under s. 313 of the CrPC that the cut marks as referred to in the seizure panchanama and as described by the witnesses were already there. In view of this voluminous evidence, oral as well as documentary, non-production of the almirah in question or even the supratnama did not create any infirmity, legal or otherwise, in the prosecution case. The learned trial Judge has lost sight of this pertinent aspect and recorded the erroneous conclusion that the prosecution could not substantiate the charge in the absence of either the almirah in question or supratnama thereof. Since the approach of the learned trial Judge in this regard is patently incorrect, the impugned finding has resulted in miscarriage of justice.
15. The act of the accused-respondent in opening the almirah in question by effecting cuts at two places between the night of 29th Oct., 1985, and 30th Oct., 1985, is derogatory to the direction as contained in the prohibitory order dt. 29th Oct., 1985. This act certainly constitutes contravention of the order. The accused-respondent by this Act has rendered himself liable for the offence punishable under s. 275A of the Act.
16. The accused-respondent further by the same act, certainly with definite intention to commit mischief, has effected the cut marks on the almirah and, therefore, he is liable for the offence punishable under s. 461 of the IPC.
17. It is evident from the testimony of P. W.-2, Krishnamachari, and P. W.-3, Prasad, that the almirah in question containing pawned jewellery was kept in the care and custody of the accused-respondent. The prohibitory order (exhibit 18), therefore, came to be issued. Under this order, P. W.-3 has specifically directed, “I hereby order you not to remove, part with or otherwise deal with the articles mentioned below without my previous permission.” This circumstance has also fortified that the almirah in question was in the care and custody of the accused and he was capable of dealing with it which has been prohibited by order (exhibit 18). Besides this, the accused had complete domain over the almirah since it was kept in the bed room of the premises of the accused which was not sealed or locked by the Department. The care and custody of the accused besides the substantive testimony is also supported by the text of the complaint marked as exhibit 16. The complainant (P. W.-2) has specifically stated that “the entire almirah along with gold and silver ornaments was entrusted to the accused by the complainant from
10.30 p.m. of 29th Oct., 1985.”
18. The articles in the almirah were removed while the same were under the custody and domain of the accused. It is true that the officers did not prepare an inventory of the jewellery which was kept in that almirah. However, it is undisputed from the testimony, as discussed earlier that on the next day, on opening the almirah, it was noticed that the level of the bags of jewellery as dumped on the earlier day had gone down. It is true that the prosecution could not exactly quantify or estimate the material or the articles missing from the almirah, but the aspect as discussed is definitely suggestive of the removal of the jewellery when the almirah was in the trust of the accused- respondent. The accused-respondent is, therefore, liable to be punished for the offence under s. 406 of the IPC.
19. We heard Shri Palshikar on the question of sentence. According to Shri Palshikar, the incident is of 1985. Besides this, accused Narayan Bajaj is an old man of 65 years. In view of these circumstances, leniency be shown. Shri Charde and Shri Jaiswal, however, resisted the submission. According to them, the constituting of the offence is very serious and it is also interference in the discharge of the official duties by the Government servants. The manner in which the offence has been committed, in the submission of learned counsel, does not deserve any sympathetic or lenient view. Considering the rival submissions, we pass the following order.
20. Crl. Appeal No. 195 of 1987 and Crl. Revn. Appln. No. 153 of 1987 are allowed. The finding of acquittal, vide impugned judgment dt. 6th April, 1987, is hereby set aside. The accused-respondent Narayan S/o. Champalal Bajaj is convicted for the offence punishable under s. 275A of the IT Act and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months. He is further directed to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000. In case of default, he shall suffer further rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months.
21. He is further convicted for the offence punishable under s. 461 of the IPC and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and further directed to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000. In case of default, he shall suffer further rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months.
22. He is also convicted for the offence punishable under s. 406 of the IPC and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and pay a fine of Rs. 5,000. In case of default, he shall suffer further rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months.
23. We direct the substantive sentences only to run concurrently. However, the sentences as imposed in case of default for payment of fine shall not run concurrently.
[Citation : 201 ITR 315]
