Allahabad H.C : Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to exemption under s. 5(1)(iv) of the WT Act in respect of cinema building owned by the firm ?

High Court Of Allahabad

CIT vs. Jai Kishan Gupta

Sections 5(1)(iv)

Asst. Year 1974-75, 1976-77, 1977-78

M. Katju & Umeshwar Pandey, JJ.

IT Ref. No. 238 of 1983

23rd September, 2003

JUDGMENT

M. KATJU, J. :

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This is a wealth-tax reference under s. 27(1) of the WT Act in which the following question has been referred to us for our opinion : “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to exemption under s. 5(1)(iv) of the WT Act in respect of cinema building owned by the firm ?”

3. The assessee is a firm and the relevant assessment years are 1974-75 to 1977-78. The assessee has 50 per cent share in the firm M/s Jai Kishan Anand Swarup, Bulandshahr. The assets in the firm consist of a cinema building, and the question in this case is whether the assessee’s 50 per cent share in the value of the cinema building is exempt from wealth-tax. The WTO rejected the claim of the assessee but the AAC allowed his claim. The Tribunal dismissed the second appeal filed by the Department.

4. The short question in this case is whether a cinema building can be treated to be a house for the purpose of s.5(1)(iv) of the WT Act. Sec. 5(1)(iv) at the relevant time stated that the following asset shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee. “One house or part of the house belonging to the assessee.”

5. The word ‘house’ has not been defined in the WT Act, nor in the General Clauses Act. However, the word ‘building’ has been used in s. 5(1)(iii) of the WT Act, and in s. 5(1)(i) the word ‘property’ has been used. Thus, the WT Act has used the words ‘house’, ‘building’ and ‘property’ in different places, and hence meanings should ordinarily be ascribed to these words in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation. We, therefore, do not agree with the learned counsel for the assessee that all buildings must be regarded as houses within the meaning of the term used in s. 5(1)(iv). In common parlance a house means a place where people live. Of course a residential building can also be given for commercial purpose and yet it will remain a house. However, by no stretch of imagination can a cinema hall be regarded as a house. No one ever calls a cinema hall a house.

6. Learned counsel for the assessee has relied on the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in CWT vs. Tulsi Das (2002) 174 CTR (Raj) 436 : (2002) 256 ITR 73 (Raj) wherein it has been held that a cinema hall is a house. We respectfully disagree with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court. The Rajasthan High Court in that decision has held that for getting exemption under s. 5(1) (iv) it is not necessary that the house be exclusively used for residential purposes. We agree with this reasoning of the Rajasthan High Court that even if a house is used for commercial purposes it will nevertheless remain a house which can claim exemption. However, if it is not a house at all at its inception then it cannot get exemption under s. 5(1)(iv). There may be cases where a person uses, or has given his residential house on rent, for commercial purpose but it will still remain a house. But if the building is not a house at all it cannot get exemption.

7. In the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the word “house” is defined as follows “a building for human habitation, a dwelling, a home”. In “Legal Thesaurus” by William C Burton a house is defined as ‘abode, dwelling place, home, habitation, living place, living quarters, residence, etc.’ In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon (1997 Edition), a house is defined as a place of dwelling or habitation.

8. In Chapman vs. Royal Bank (1881) 7 Q.B. 140 it was held that a house means “a permanent building in which the tenant, or the owner and his family, dwells or lives.” The same interpretation has been given by our Courts e.g. in Shiv Narain Chaudhari vs. CIT 1977 CTR (All) 149 : (1977) 108 ITR 104 (All), CWT vs. K.B. Pradhan (1981) 130 ITR 393 (Ori),

9. In may be mentioned that from asst. yr. 1957-58 to 1971-72 it was one of the conditions for claiming exemption under s. 5(1)(iv) that the house should be exclusively used by the assessee for residential purpose. This condition was abrogated from 1972-73 by Finance Act, 1971. However, this will only mean that after 1972 even if the assessee lets out his house on rent for residential or commercial purpose, or himself uses it for commercial purpose he will still get the exemption.

10. A cinema hall is not a building for human habitation or a dwelling or a home. Hence, a cinema hall is not a house at all. To get exemption it must be a house in the first place which a cinema hall is not. Hence, in our opinion the assessee cannot get exemption under s. 5(1)(iv).

11. For the reasons given above the reference is answered in the negative i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessee.

[Citation : 264 ITR 482]

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