High Court Of Allahabad
Sanjay Khetan vs. CIT & Ors.
Sections Sch. II, r. 68B
Asst. Year 1942-43, 1944-45, 1946-47, 1948-49, 1950-51, 1952-53, 1954-55, 1956-57, 1958-59, 1960-61, 1962-63, 1964-65, 1966-67, 1968-69, 1970-71, 1972-73, 1974-75, 1976-77, 1977-78
M. Katju & R.S. Tripathi, JJ.
Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 251 of 1997
12th December, 2003
Counsel Appeared
S.P. Gupta & Shakeel Ahmad, for the Petitioner : Bharat Ji Agarwal, for the Respondents
JUDGMENT
M. Katju, J. :
This writ petition has been filed for quashing the notice dt. 26th March, 1997, published in the Hindi newspaper Rashtriya Sahara dt. 28th March, 1997, vide Annex. 13 to the writ petition, and to quash the recovery proceedings against the petitioner and for vacating the attachment and restoring the properties in question to the petitioner. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the sale of immovable properties of the petitioner at Padrauna and Tamkuhi, and has also prayed for a mandamus restraining the respondents from selling immovable properties Nos. 170 and 360, Sahebganj, Padrauna. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
It is alleged in para 2 of the petition that the petitioner is a grandson of Shri Hari Ram S/o. Shri Ramanand, who along with other persons was partner in the firm known as M/s Ganesh Narain Onkarmal. The particulars are given in para 2 of the writ petition. Subsequently, two of the partners died and one Sri Durga Prasad joined the partnership. Certain income-tax recoveries were issued against the members of the firm and one of the partners, Matadin Khetan, filed a Writ Petn. No. 5957 of 1971 (Matadin Khetan vs. Union of India) challenging the recoveries. It is alleged in para 7 of the writ petition that during the course of arguments learned counsel for the Department stated that the recovery certificates have been withdrawn and the Department does not propose to take any action in pursuance of these certificates. Hence, the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous on 23rd Aug.,1972, vide Annex. 1 to the writ petition. Subsequently, the petitioner challenged the sale of the property No. 360, Sahebganj by Writ Petn. No. 17690 of 1995 (Sanjay Khetan vs. Union of India) which was disposed of by this Court on 22nd Jan., 1997, directing the TRO to decide the petitioner’s representation. A true copy of the order is Annex. 2 to the writ petition. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a representation and he was asked by the TRO to furnish certain details vide Annexs. 3 to 6 to the writ petition. The TRO by his order dt. 26th Feb., 1997, rejected the petitioner’s request for releasing the properties 360 and 170, Sahebganj, Padrauna, vide order dt. 26th Feb.,1997, Annex. 7 to the writ petition.
It is alleged in para 14 of the petition that vide dt. 6th Jan., 1995, the petitioner raised the plea that as per the statement of standing counsel for the Department the recovery certificates issued for the asst. yrs. 1945-46 to 1960-61, became time-barred including the recovery certificate dt. 23rd April, 1971, issued for Rs. 51,04,197.07. It was also alleged that the sale proclamation dt. 4th Jan., 1995, relating to the aforesaid assessment years was invalid. The petitioner not only objected to the sale of 360, Sahebganj, but also other properties as being time- barred. The petitioner alleged that the recovery certificate dt. 21st March, 1982, and all the recovery proceedings pursuant thereto and the sale proclamation dt. 4th Jan., 1995, were illegal and should be cancelled. However, this objection was rejected. A true copy of the representation of the petitioner dt. 22nd April, 1995, is Annex. 8 to the writ petition. Various other objections were also taken to the recoveries but they were all rejected.
It is alleged in para 31 of the writ petition that the properties in dispute were attached as far back as in 1979, and all the orders giving rise to the demand of tax, interest, fine and penalty and other sums have become final under Chapter XX of the IT Act. A true copy of the attachment order dt. 21st March, 1979, is Annex. 11A to the writ petition. It is alleged that the sale of the properties is barred by r. 68B of the Second Schedule to the IT Act.
By the impugned notice dt. 26th March, 1997, published in the newspaper Rashtriya Sahara dt. 28th March, 1997, the properties 170 and 360, Sahebganj, Padrauna, have been notified to be auctioned on 31st March, 1997, vide Annex. 13 to the petition. Aggrieved, this petition has been filed in this Court. A counter-affidavit has been filed and we have perused the same.
In para 5 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that on a reference made by the TRO, Third Central, Bombay, recovery proceedings were started and several properties of the defaulters situated at different places including property at 360, Sahebganj South, Padrauna, were attached. In para 12 it is stated that there was a huge demand against the defaulter and the tax outstanding was not paid by him even after several opportunities, and hence there was no option but to auction the immovable properties of the defaulters.
It is alleged in para 13 of the counter-affidavit that the present recovery is in respect of the demand for the asst. yrs. 1942-43 to 1977-78.
It is alleged in paras 29, 31 and 32 of the counter-affidavit that r. 68B of the Second Schedule does not apply because the High Court vide order dt. 5th July, 1995 (quoted in para 31 of the counter-affidavit), has stayed the confirmation of the sale.
It is alleged in para 35 of the counter-affidavit that the sale proclamation was duly served on 28th Feb., 1997, and only thereafter it was published in the newspaper Rashtriya Sahara on 28th March, 1997. We have also perused the rejoinder affidavit.
The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the recovery was barred by r. 68B of the Second Schedule to the IT Act, 1961. Rule 68B which was inserted by the Finance Act, 1992, w.e.f. 1st June, 1992, states “Time-limit for sale of attached immovable property.—(1) No sale of immovable property shall be made under this part after the expiry of three years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has become conclusive under the provisions of s. 245-I or, as the case may be, final in terms of the provisions of Chapter XX : Provided that where the immovable property is required to be resold due to the amount of highest bid being less than the reserve price or under the circumstances mentioned in r. 57 or r. 58 or where the sale is set aside under r. 61, the aforesaid period of limitation for the sale of the immovable property shall stand extended by one year. (2) In computing the period of limitation under sub-r. (1), the period— (i) during which the levy of the aforesaid tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum is stayed by an order or injunction of any Court; or (ii) during which the proceedings of attachment or sale of the immovable property are stayed by an order or injunction of any Court; or (iii) commencing from the date of the presentation of any appeal against the order passed by the TRO under this Schedule and ending on the day the appeal is decided, shall be excluded : Provided that where immediately after the exclusion of the aforesaid period, the period of limitation for the sale of the immovable property is less than 180 days, such remaining period shall be extended to 180 days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly. (3) Where any immovable property has been attached under this part before the 1st day of June, 1992, and the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has also become conclusive or final before the said date, that date shall be deemed to be the date on which the said order has become conclusive or, as the case may be, final. (4) Where the sale of immovable property is not made in accordance with the provisions of sub-r. (1), the attachment order in relation to the said property shall be deemed to have been vacated on the expiry of the time of limitation specified under this rule.”
It appears that the wife of the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 957 of 1994 by which she challenged the same action of the respondent authorities. The said writ petition was dismissed by this Court as stated in para 6 of the counter-affidavit.
9. In our opinion, r. 68B of the Second Schedule to the IT Act is not applicable to the facts of the present case because it was inserted by the Finance Act, 1992, w.e.f. 1st June, 1992. Admittedly, the recoveries in question pertain to the asst. yrs. 1942-43 to 1977-78 and the same were pressed from time to time in accordance with law, but the petitioner succeeded in avoiding the same by one way or another as is evident from the order of the TRO dt. 26th Feb., 1997, vide Annex. 7 to the writ petition. The Finance Act, 1992, was not retrospective and hence, in our opinion, will not apply to the impugned recoveries as they were in respect of the earlier assessment years in respect of which the assessment and penalty orders have become final long before 1st June, 1992.
The recoveries for the asst. yrs. 1942-43 to 1977-78 are being made as the amounts have not been paid by the assessee-defaulter. The recovery certificate was issued on 21st March, 1982, i.e., much before the addition of r. 68B by the Finance Act, 1992. Rule 68B has been inserted w.e.f. 1st June, 1992, which is prospective. Hence, in our opinion, r. 68B applies in respect of recoveries in pursuance of the orders which were made and had become conclusive on or after 1st June, 1992.
In our opinion, the recoveries which were pending prior to the addition of r. 68B are not affected by the provisions of r. 68B which has been added only w.e.f. 1st June, 1992.
In Commissioner of Central Excise vs. T.V.S. Suzuki Ltd. 2003 (156) ELT 161 (SC), the Supreme Court has held that a claim of refund of the assessee which could have been made under the unamended r. 9B cannot be defeated on account of the amendment made in r. 9B(5) by adding a proviso thereto.
In the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India 1997 (89) ELT 247, a nine-Judges Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that in the case of provisional assessment if the duty is finally assessed, the assessee shall pay the deficiency or shall be entitled to a refund as the case may be. Hence, in respect of a refund claim in respect of the period prior to 25th June, 1999, when the amendment was made in r. 9B, the claim of refund of the assessee cannot be defeated merely because the proceedings were pending. The Supreme Court has held in Commissioner of Central Excise vs. T.V.S. Suzuki Ltd. (supra) : “… the right of the appellant does not get defeated by the subsequent amendment made in sub-r. (5) of r. 9B. The Commissioner of Central Excise and the CEGAT were, therefore, justified in holding that the claim for refund made by the appellant had to be decided according to the law laid down by this Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536 and would not be governed by the proviso to sub-r. (5) of r. 9B.” Nothing has been mentioned either in the writ petition or even in the written arguments as to when the orders giving rise to the demand had become conclusive and final either by an order of the Settlement Commission under s. 245-I or by any order of the appellate authority or revising authority under ss. 246, 254(1) or 263/264 of the IT Act, giving rise to the demands for which the recovery proceedings were initiated in the year 1972 itself when one of the writ petitions was filed. However, it is obvious from the facts that all the orders became conclusive much before 1980 and the period of three years as given in r. 68B also expired much before the addition of r. 68B. Hence, in our opinion, r. 68B is not applicable to such orders which have become final and conclusive much before 1st June, 1992. In the present case, the orders were in respect of the asst. yrs. 194243 to 1977-78 for which the recovery certificate was issued on 21st March, 1982, as admitted by the petitioner. These orders had become conclusive much before 1st June, 1992.
In our opinion, r. 68B cannot be said to be retrospective. Hence, it cannot apply in those cases where the order under s. 245-I or Chapter XX of the Act became conclusive before 1st June, 1992, which is the date on which r. 68B came into effect. Rule 68B applies only in cases where a conclusive order was passed under s. 245-I or Chapter XX of the Act on or after 1st June, 1992. Alternatively, it is also possible to hold that r. 68B will apply to cases where the three year period from the end of the financial year in which the order under s. 245-I or Chapter XX had not become conclusive before 1st June, 1992. In the present case, this three year period expired long before 1st June, 1992, and hence, the petitioner cannot get the benefit of r. 68B as in his case the demand had become final and conclusive a long time before 1st June, 1992.
15. In Athlumney, In re : Ex parte, Wilson (1898) 2 QB 547, at pp. 551-552 Wright J. observed : “Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this—that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.” The above observation has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Saharanpur Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1992) 101 CTR (SC) 452 : (1992) 194 ITR 294 (SC) (vide para 15). It has also been quoted in Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, twelfth edition, p. 216.
16. In Carson vs. Carson and Stoyek (1964) 1 WLR 511, 516 (PDA) and in C.F. Croxford vs. Universal Insurance Co. (1936) 2 KB 253 (CA), it was observed : “that page (of Maxwell) seems to me to contain an almost perfect statement of the principle that you do not give a statute retrospective operation unless there is perfectly clear language showing the intention of Parliament that it shall have a retrospective application.”
17. Broom in his Legal Maxims writes : Moon vs. Durden (1848) 2 Exch. 22, is a leading case upon this subject. It was an action upon a wager, commenced before the passing of the Gaming Act, 1845, which enacts that all contracts by way of wagering shall be null and void, and that “no suit shall be brought or maintained” for recovering money alleged to be won upon a wager. This Act was passed while the action was pending and the question was whether it operated to defeat the plaintiff’s claim. The Court of Exchequer decided that it did not. “The language of the clause”, said Parke J., “if taken in its ordinary sense, as in the first instance we ought to take it, applies to all contracts—both past and future, and to all actions—both present and future on any wager, whether past or future.” However, it is, as Lord Coke says : “A rule and law of Parliament that regularly, nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis. This rule, which is in effect that enactments in a statute are generally to be construed to be prospective, and intended to regulate the future conduct of persons, is deeply founded in good sense and strict justice, and has been acted upon in many cases.”
18. In Ward vs. British Oak Insurance Co. (1932) 1 KB 392 (CA), Scrutton LJ : observed : “unless an intention to the contrary is clear, an Act is to be construed as operating only on cases or facts which come into existence after the Act, and not retrospectively on cases or facts which had come into existence before the Act.” [see also Harlal vs. Lala Prasad AIR 1931 Nag 138].
19. In our opinion, r. 68B should not be construed to impair the obligation on the assessee to pay his taxes, particularly when it has not been enacted retrospectively.
20. As a general rule, every statute is deemed to be prospective, unless by express provision or necessary implication it is to have a retrospective effect.
21. In Punjab Tin Supply Co. vs. Central Government AIR 1984 SC 87, the Supreme Court observed : “All laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations, unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive.” The general rule is that ordinarily retrospective effect is not given to a statute. There is a presumption against retrospective effect vide Rashid Bibi vs. Tufail Mohammad AIR 1941 Lah 291. Any new law that is made should ordinarily affect future transactions, not past ones.
22. In Hough vs. Windus (1883-1884) 12 QBD 224 (CA), Bowen LJ. observed : It is a “wellrecognised rule that statutes should be interpreted if possible, so as to respect vested rights”. The same view was taken in In re, A Debtor (1936) 1 Ch. 237, 243; National Real Estate & Finance Co. vs. Hassan (1939) 2 KB 61 (CA); Craies, Statute Law, Fifth Edn., p. 368; Abdul Jameel vs. Simon and Machonochy Ltd. (1967) ILR 2 Mad 324 : (1967) 1 Mad LJ 337. Ordinarily a statute will not affect rights which had accrued before the statute came into force, unless there are express words in the statute affecting such rights or where a retrospective effect to the statute is inevitable by necessary intendment or implication, vide State vs. P.M.L. Srivastava (1953) ALJ 339, etc.
23. In our opinion, the vested rights of the State are to be respected as much as the rights of private persons. Since final and conclusive assessment orders had been passed against the petitioner, the petitioner has the duty to pay those taxes and correspondingly the State has the right to collect them. Thus, the obligation of the individual taxpayer corresponds to a right in the State to get those taxes. Hence, the State had a vested right long before r.68B came into force w.e.f. 1st June, 1992. This right of the State should not be denied by treating r. 68B as retrospective.
It is well-settled that a statute which impairs vested rights or the legality of past transactions or obligations should not prima facie be held to be retrospective. Vested rights belong to the State also, and not merely to private parties.
The right of a State to collect its taxes cannot be taken away or restricted by implication vide N. C. Agarwal vs. Krishan Lal Mehra AIR 1961 All 104 (FB) and Gaddam Narsa Reddy vs. Collector AIR 1982 AP 1 (FB), etc.
In our opinion, a statute is not to be construed to operate retrospectively so as to take away a vested right unless that intention is made manifest by language so plain and unmistakable that there is no possibility of any choice of meaning.
In view of the clear enunciation of the law we are of the opinion that the petitioner will not get the benefit of r. 68B which came into effect from 1st June, 1992. The State has a right to collect taxes, for, without taxes, the State cannot function. Moreover, writ jurisdiction is a discretionary jurisdiction vide Chandra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 JT 20 SC (vide para 42), wherein the Supreme Court observed : “Issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy [see Champalal Binani vs. CIT AIR 1970 SC 645]. The High Court and consequently this Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India may not strike down an illegal order although it would be lawful to do so.”
26. We are not inclined to exercise our discretion under Art. 226 of the Constitution in this case. The total demand as per the sale proclamation is to the tune of Rs. 75,38,000 plus interest and hence we are not inclined to interfere with these admitted recoveries on technical objections. A person who seeks a writ has not only to show violation of law but he has also to show equity in his favour. Hence, even assuming that r. 68B is in the petitioner’s favour, there is no equity in his favour as the demands are on the basis of the assessment years which have become final long ago. An honest man should pay his taxes, instead of relying on technicalities. Hence, we are not inclined to exercise our discretion under Art. 226 in favour of a person who refuses to pay his admitted taxes. The petition is dismissed. Interim order is vacated.
[Citation : 266 ITR 453]
